Re: [tcpm] TCP-AO review comments.

>-----Original Message-----
>From: tcpm-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:tcpm-bounces@ietf.org] On 
>Behalf Of Joe Touch
>Sent: Monday, August 04, 2008 10:29 AM
>
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>Hash: SHA1
>
>Hi, Ananth,
>
>Just a few remaining points to clarify...
>
>Anantha Ramaiah (ananth) wrote:
>|> | #1
>|> |    I have problem with the term "obsoletes 2385" [ I did
>|> bring this up
>|> | before] It is going to be a long time before deployments
>|> move over to
>|> | the new TCP auth option.
>|>
>|> Practically, "obsoletes" doesn't obsolete anything. It does
>|> indicate that the IETF wants a protocol to be replaced by
>|> something else. That doesn't mean the older one can't be used
>|> for legacy support, e.g., AFAICT - and that clearly should
>|> apply here. If the IESG thinks that this is consistent with
>|> "Obsoltes", would that be OK?
>|
>| Sure, ok let me rephrase the question here : "TCP MD5 option would
>| continue to exist and should be supported for quite sometime" Does
>| "obselete" allow this fact?
>
>My impression is that it does, i.e., it recommends replacement, but
>doesn't prevent it being used for legacy purposes.
>
>< I would have preferred "Updates/Revises"
>| which gives some leeway for co-existence to support legacy.
>
>We're not changing anything in TCP MD5, so we neither update 
>nor revise it.
>
>It seems like those of us replying are in agreement on this overall
>point, but don't quite know what the best language to use is (if others
>want to debate that point, though, please do). It might be 
>useful to ask
>the IESG for advice (which I will do).

I think that "obsoletes" is correct.  There are problems with 2385, and
AO is the solution that we're creating to replace it.  We *do* want to
discourage 2385 use when AO is ready, so obsoleting seems like the right
thing to do.  Of course someone could still use 2385; the status of a
document has no power over what's in an implementation or enabled in a
deployment, we just don't want to encourage it.

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