Re: [tcpm] Roman Danyliw's No Objection on draft-ietf-tcpm-rfc793bis-25: (with COMMENT)

"touch@strayalpha.com" <touch@strayalpha.com> Sat, 08 January 2022 05:13 UTC

Return-Path: <touch@strayalpha.com>
X-Original-To: tcpm@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: tcpm@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 65AE13A040C; Fri, 7 Jan 2022 21:13:26 -0800 (PST)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -1.318
X-Spam-Level:
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-1.318 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, DKIM_SIGNED=0.1, DKIM_VALID=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_AU=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_EF=-0.1, HTML_MESSAGE=0.001, SPF_HELO_NONE=0.001, SPF_NEUTRAL=0.779, URIBL_BLOCKED=0.001] autolearn=no autolearn_force=no
Authentication-Results: ietfa.amsl.com (amavisd-new); dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=strayalpha.com
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id iSlZ80KaCb7v; Fri, 7 Jan 2022 21:13:22 -0800 (PST)
Received: from server217-3.web-hosting.com (server217-3.web-hosting.com [198.54.115.226]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 40E5E3A040B; Fri, 7 Jan 2022 21:13:22 -0800 (PST)
DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; q=dns/txt; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=strayalpha.com; s=default; h=To:References:Message-Id:Cc:Date:In-Reply-To: From:Subject:Mime-Version:Content-Type:Sender:Reply-To: Content-Transfer-Encoding:Content-ID:Content-Description:Resent-Date: Resent-From:Resent-Sender:Resent-To:Resent-Cc:Resent-Message-ID:List-Id: List-Help:List-Unsubscribe:List-Subscribe:List-Post:List-Owner:List-Archive; bh=5/B0ikpmFyom059f7O2kr+yICJ97UDGiSLiRkCvtvUU=; b=tGm7cFmitwWI08nfgOVXcbmZG7 nojuI6WQXOcnL/H8Vbg5ngLC3QYuMKF/8Qh2VBQ/AG81gtizKhZMn6VawgTL4U/9jtFR13CB6aVd3 p2Pj9gbs27m4b8CwcAu3V8Gr4e8VLwRpdUL7ZAdmH5OvDQLCRieQm9eETfmINaDvhUmN8kpZz6xa+ EnCmlqgssKER23rEMjcNMw7MCflS9wIoiVBhyNGFS3QsKfSpqX4ZszKPvscBlWTeuG3vY2HY2YdQH IEHp63Qqua2KJeI4qhAeSOAqPD9t/ZkutUPsGF4qEL3ha3rP/DvLM/gOxUerhRWRaCPHnWykmjZ35 tmTxAnEg==;
Received: from cpe-172-114-237-88.socal.res.rr.com ([172.114.237.88]:61694 helo=smtpclient.apple) by server217.web-hosting.com with esmtpsa (TLS1.2) tls TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (Exim 4.94.2) (envelope-from <touch@strayalpha.com>) id 1n642X-00D8bJ-DX; Sat, 08 Jan 2022 00:13:21 -0500
Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="Apple-Mail=_CBF74DDF-8ACC-4658-8392-D759E3AB11F6"
Mime-Version: 1.0 (Mac OS X Mail 15.0 \(3693.20.0.1.32\))
From: "touch@strayalpha.com" <touch@strayalpha.com>
In-Reply-To: <5c85c503-9113-6887-2c56-9b8fd9c0b469@mti-systems.com>
Date: Fri, 07 Jan 2022 21:13:11 -0800
Cc: Roman Danyliw <rdd@cert.org>, The IESG <iesg@ietf.org>, draft-ietf-tcpm-rfc793bis@ietf.org, tcpm IETF list <tcpm@ietf.org>, tcpm-chairs@ietf.org
Message-Id: <F79A1CDA-B38A-42F0-A111-E703F896C78C@strayalpha.com>
References: <163236958629.2342.800968324528950977@ietfa.amsl.com> <5c85c503-9113-6887-2c56-9b8fd9c0b469@mti-systems.com>
To: Wes Eddy <wes@mti-systems.com>
X-Mailer: Apple Mail (2.3693.20.0.1.32)
X-OutGoing-Spam-Status: No, score=-1.0
X-AntiAbuse: This header was added to track abuse, please include it with any abuse report
X-AntiAbuse: Primary Hostname - server217.web-hosting.com
X-AntiAbuse: Original Domain - ietf.org
X-AntiAbuse: Originator/Caller UID/GID - [47 12] / [47 12]
X-AntiAbuse: Sender Address Domain - strayalpha.com
X-Get-Message-Sender-Via: server217.web-hosting.com: authenticated_id: touch@strayalpha.com
X-Authenticated-Sender: server217.web-hosting.com: touch@strayalpha.com
X-Source:
X-Source-Args:
X-Source-Dir:
X-From-Rewrite: unmodified, already matched
Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/tcpm/ovjbBzITPVhe3SV7NoCzf1kuEuU>
Subject: Re: [tcpm] Roman Danyliw's No Objection on draft-ietf-tcpm-rfc793bis-25: (with COMMENT)
X-BeenThere: tcpm@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.29
Precedence: list
List-Id: TCP Maintenance and Minor Extensions Working Group <tcpm.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/tcpm>, <mailto:tcpm-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/tcpm/>
List-Post: <mailto:tcpm@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:tcpm-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tcpm>, <mailto:tcpm-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Sat, 08 Jan 2022 05:13:27 -0000

> On Jan 7, 2022, at 12:12 PM, Wesley Eddy <wes@mti-systems.com> wrote:
> 
>> ** Section 3.4.  Per “There are security issues that result if an off-path
>> attacker is able to predict or guess ISN values”, a reference might be helpful
>> for this statement.  Perhaps [41] or [Morris185] from [41].
> ACK; Zahed also mentioned this and I think [41] is a good reference because it includes some more context beyond just [Morris1985] alone, and of course it includes reference to [Morris1985] itself as well.
> 
The ISN is relevant only during the TWHS; otherwise, it’s not. I really wish we’d stop worrying so much about the ISN itself.

I.e., ISNs aren’t the issue; being able to guess or hit *inside the active window* is.

That can happen two ways - knowing the ISN *or* having the sequence numbers move through the whole number space.

And the latter is not mitigated by any sort of magically unpredictable ISN.

Joe