[tcpm] Some comments on tcpsecure

[Fernando Gont <[e-mail]>]

Folks,

I have not yet reviewed the entire document (but will do). However, 
reading the security considerations section (and at the risk of 
sounding our own horn?), I see this document does not reference two 
closely related wg documents of the tcpm and tsvwg working groups.

The first one is the ICMP attacks draft 
(draft-ietf-tcpm-icmp-attacks). While tcpsecure mentions the security 
implications of ICMP on TCP conenctions, it does not reference the 
I-D. IIRC, this had already been pointed out by Joe (?). As far as 
the specifications are concerned, you shouldn't bother to fix 
TCP-based reset attacks if you don't fix the the ICMP-based ones.

The other doc is the port randomization draft 
(draft-tsvwg-port-randomization). All the math in the "Slipping in 
the window" paper assumes TCP implementtions use a small port number 
subspace for selecting the ephemeral ports. And also assumes that 
implementations use a trivially-predictable sequence. Clearly, port 
randomization is a trivial mitigation for both these and all other 
off-path attacks that require the attacker to guess or know the 
four-tuple that identifies the connection to be attacked.

Thanks,

--
Fernando Gont
e-mail: [e-mail] || [e-mail]
PGP Fingerprint: 7809 84F5 322E 45C7 F1C9 3945 96EE A9EF D076 FFF1




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