[Teas] Roman Danyliw's No Objection on draft-ietf-teas-pce-native-ip-15: (with COMMENT)

[Roman Danyliw via Datatracker <[e-mail]>]

Roman Danyliw has entered the following ballot position for
draft-ietf-teas-pce-native-ip-15: No Objection

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COMMENT:
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Thanks to Donald Eastlake for the SECDIR review

** Section 8.  Since PCE is used to setup the BGP sessions, etc., the
references to the Security Considerations of PCE specs should be reiterated as
applying – minimally RFC5440 and RFC8231.

** To restate Alvaro Retana's comment #9, RFC8231 already notes that malicious
PCE and PCCs are possible (see above comment).  In this context, the new
variant relevant to this architecture would be in form of (malicious) BGP
configurations.  It's worth highlighting.