Re: [Teas] Roman Danyliw's No Objection on draft-ietf-teas-yang-te-topo-21: (with COMMENT)

[Xufeng Liu <[e-mail]>]

Hi Roman,

(2) Section 4.2.  Per “Although an authorized client MAY receive a TE
topology

> with the client ID field   matching some other client”, why would this
>> happen?
>> Couldn’t this potentially leak customized TE information across clients?
>>
> [Xufeng]: Right. This does leak the information across clients. Whether
> to allow this or not is an implementation policy, which can be supported
> by other IETF documents and models, such as RFC8341 Network Configuration
> Access Control Model. Section 8. contains the following:
>
> The Network Configuration Access Control Model (NACM) [RFC8341]
> provides the means to restrict access for particular NETCONF or
> RESTCONF users to a preconfigured subset of all available NETCONF or
> RESTCONF protocol operations and content.
>
>
> Understood. As non-blocking feedback, I’d recommend adding sentence to
> explain this nuance.
>


[Xufeng]: Agree that a bit more description would be better. Would it be OK
to add the following to the end of this section:

Even though this data model allows to access TE topology information across
clients, implementations MAY restrict access for particular clients to
particular data fields. The Network Configuration Access Control Model
(NACM) [RFC8341] provides such a mechanism.

Thanks,

- Xufeng