Re: [Teep] Security domain default 1-to-1 mapping to a TA proposal in TEEP

Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu> Sun, 10 March 2019 16:58 UTC

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Date: Sun, 10 Mar 2019 11:57:56 -0500
From: Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
To: Mingliang Pei <Mingliang_Pei@symantec.com>
CC: Andrew Atyeo <andrew.atyeo@intercede.com>, "teep@ietf.org" <teep@ietf.org>
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Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/teep/SF1f71hva8dxfE4YFoiuUzUo-0M>
Subject: Re: [Teep] Security domain default 1-to-1 mapping to a TA proposal in TEEP
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It would probably be good to get a summary of the discussion posted on the
list once it's settled down, for archival purposes.

-Ben

On Fri, Mar 08, 2019 at 03:39:02PM +0000, Mingliang Pei wrote:
> Thanks Andy, will follow up updates on the github, Ming
> 
> Sent from iPhone
> 
> ________________________________
> From: Andrew Atyeo <andrew.atyeo@intercede.com>
> Sent: Friday, March 8, 2019 1:42 AM
> To: Mingliang Pei
> Cc: teep@ietf.org
> Subject: RE: Security domain default 1-to-1 mapping to a TA proposal in TEEP
> 
> Hi,
> I have updated the github issue with my comments
> https://github.com/ietf-teep/architecture/issues/7<https://clicktime.symantec.com/3DtasvM638D48u9sEW2edx47Vc?u=https%3A%2F%2Fgithub.com%2Fietf-teep%2Farchitecture%2Fissues%2F7>
> 
> basically I understand that there are some deployment types that might prefer a simpler approach, but I want to make sure that we know what would be ‘lost’ by not having a SD that is created separately. It might be that for some deployments the loss is no problem, or it might be that there could be alternative ways to give the same functionality but without need for a separate createSD that are worth exploring.
> The github issue (link above) hopefully explains this better.
> 
> Regards,
> 
> Andrew Atyeo
> Security Architect
> Intercede
> Digital trust    people ǀ devices ǀ apps
> Office: +44 (0) 1455 558 111
> www.intercede.com<https://clicktime.symantec.com/3Gqczp4aRiNtTy5rmhmPUeK7Vc?u=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.intercede.com%2F>
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> From: Mingliang Pei <Mingliang_Pei@symantec.com>
> Sent: 08 March 2019 02:00
> To: Andrew Atyeo <Andrew.Atyeo@intercede.com>
> Cc: teep@ietf.org
> Subject: Security domain default 1-to-1 mapping to a TA proposal in TEEP
> 
> Hi Andy,
> 
> We are working on to close this issue #7: clarifying meaning of Security Domain (SD)
> 
> https://github.com/ietf-teep/architecture/issues/7<https://clicktime.symantec.com/3DtasvM638D48u9sEW2edx47Vc?u=https%3A%2F%2Fgithub.com%2Fietf-teep%2Farchitecture%2Fissues%2F7>
> 
> We want to simplify it, and propose to create a SD per TA by default, without completely removing the SD for some existing use cases. It will be good to also have your input on the implications, considering you have more involved in this with a prior OTrP TAM POC implementation. Could you review the issue, and provide comments there?
> 
> Here is a quick recap on some discussion reasonings.
> 
> Historically we consider Security Domain as a first class entity in TEEP (OTrP). There have been some desires to simplify it, or not require it in the TEEP architecture as some use cases don’t use it as much as potential IoT use cases. On the other hand, we know that existing TEE implementations and other secure element related practices uses SD to isolate and associate protection boundary. There was some resource constraints on number of SDs that can be allocated in a TEE device.
> 
> To achieve broad support of both worlds, we consider to move to an “implicit” model as follows:
> 
> 
>   *   One SD is created per TA when a TA is going to installed. This allows creation of TA without going through explicit SD creation and so on.
>   *   The prior deletion of SD will delete all TAs within the same SD. Now each TA will be required to be explicitly deleted.
> 
> Thanks,
> 
> Ming
> 

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