Re: [Teep] draft-ietf-teep-protocol-05

[Dave Thaler <[e-mail]>]

Russ Housley wrote:
> TECHNICAL QUESTIONS AND SUGGESTIONS
> 
> In Section 4.2, tes discussion of token says:
> 
>       The TAM MUST expire the token value after receiving the first
>       responce from the device and ignore any subsequent messages that
>       have the same token value.
> 
> Should this say the first response that has a valid signature?  Otherwise, we are creating an opportunity for an attacker to quickly respond with a matching token but otherwise garbage.  Then a legitimate responder will be ignored.

Yes, although there is also some discussion of possibly getting rid of the
token (but no consensus yet to do so) and using other mechanisms instead.

For the real answer to your question, section 6.1 second paragraph
says to drop the message if it is not valid according to the rules
in 4.1.2.  Section 4.1.2 explains that the TEEP message fields are only
looked at in step 6, so by the time you get to the text in section 4.2
you've already passed steps 1-5, so you get the meaning you stated.

> In Section 4.2, the discussion of ocsp-data says: "certificates up to the root certificate".  I do not think we want an OCSP response for the trust anchor (a.k.a., root certificate).  I suggest: "certificates up, but not including, to the root certificate".

Acknowledged.

> In Section 7, I think that future ciphersuites should allow MAC algorithms other than HMAC, such as GMAC.

Do you believe any text change is needed?

> In Section 9, please say whether future registrations will allow integrity-without-confidentiality ciphersuites.  Let's settle this now instead of dumping on the IANA Expert.
> 
> For the reference to OCSP, please use RFC 6960 (not RFC 2560).
> 
> The document talks about certificates, so it should reference RFC 5280.

Acknowledged.

> EDITORIAL SUGGESTIONS

Got them, thanks!

Dave