Re: [therightkey] algorithm blacklisting

Jacob Appelbaum <jacob@appelbaum.net> Fri, 03 January 2014 17:46 UTC

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Date: Fri, 03 Jan 2014 17:42:17 +0000
From: Jacob Appelbaum <jacob@appelbaum.net>
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Subject: Re: [therightkey] algorithm blacklisting
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Leif Johansson:
> On 2014-01-02 23:50, Paul Hoffman wrote:
>> On Jan 2, 2014, at 10:57 AM, Jacob Appelbaum <jacob@appelbaum.net>
>> wrote:
>> 
>>> I control the private key for the rouge CA that we created.
>> True. However, that rogue CA is not trusted in any root pile,
>> right? You holding a private key for a trusted CA was,
>> appropriately a big deal. You holding a private key for an
>> untrusted CA is uninteresting.
>> 
> 
> My understanding of what Jakob wrote is that he holds the key for a 
> subordinate CA. Unless the CA that "signed" that subordinate has
> been removed from trust lists then that subordinate would still be
> useful, yes.

Yes, that is correct. And only people like Firefox actually ship it and
explicitly distrust it, I believe. Perhaps others have followed since
our original research. There are a few reasons a browser or program may
not trust it - generally speaking, the expiry date is what we added to
ensure that it wouldn't be abused. That is easy to solve though - just
attack NTP first! :-)

All the best,
Jacob