Re: [therightkey] [dane] DANE and CT

Tom Ritter <tom@ritter.vg> Wed, 14 November 2012 17:51 UTC

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From: Tom Ritter <tom@ritter.vg>
Date: Wed, 14 Nov 2012 12:51:04 -0500
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To: Shumon Huque <shuque@upenn.edu>
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Cc: therightkey <therightkey@ietf.org>, Ben Laurie <benl@google.com>, IETF DANE WG list <dane@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [therightkey] [dane] DANE and CT
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On 14 November 2012 12:29, Shumon Huque <shuque@upenn.edu> wrote:

> One critical difference is that with DANE, I can query the DNSSEC
> delegation chain myself and detect whether my TLD has installed a
> bogus DS record and take action. I cannot today detect a bogus
> X.509 cert by myself. I think this makes a CT like scheme less necessary
> for DANE.


I can query my server on port 443 and see if there is a bogus certificate.
 The lack of a bogus certificate in a response to a single query does not
mean there is not a valid attacker-controlled signature chain an attacker
could send to attack a user - whether that signature chain is of PKIX
signatures or DNSSEC signatures.

-tom