Re: [therightkey] Basically, it's about keeping the CAs honest

Nico Williams <nico@cryptonector.com> Tue, 14 February 2012 00:28 UTC

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Date: Mon, 13 Feb 2012 18:28:58 -0600
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From: Nico Williams <nico@cryptonector.com>
To: Kyle Hamilton <aerowolf@gmail.com>
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Cc: therightkey@ietf.org, mrex@sap.com
Subject: Re: [therightkey] Basically, it's about keeping the CAs honest
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On Mon, Feb 13, 2012 at 5:08 PM, Kyle Hamilton <aerowolf@gmail.com> wrote:
> I think the existing mandate that everything be authenticated and tunneled
> end-to-end only hurts the IETF.  We need to develop systems within models

If it's not end-to-end it's hop-by-hop or worse: no security.  So you
think hop-by-hop is better than end-to-end?  Yes, there are systems
where only hop-by-hop security works, but generally we should prefer
end-to-end.  If you have a good argument for !end-to-end I'm all ears.

Perhaps you don't like trusted third parties.  But end-to-end doesn't
imply trusted third parties.  Internet scale security has required
trusted third parties to date, but it's not because of the end-to-end
architecture.  (Or perhaps I completely misunderstood you.)

Nico
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