Re: [therightkey] Basically, it's about keeping the CAs honest

[Martin Rex <[e-mail]>]

Kyle,

Kyle H wrote:
>
> We MUST permit every use of our protocols.  We MUST describe the
> computational processes and we MUST define the intended semantics,
> but we MUST NOT try to sabotage anything that the standards'
> implementors or consumers try to do.  If we do, we're overstepping
> the bounds of what authority we can legitimately claim as standards
> designers.

We seem to be talking about completely different protocols.

*I* am talking about TLS (any version), which has the clearly stated
design goal:

  http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2246

   Abstract

   This document specifies Version 1.0 of the Transport Layer Security
   (TLS) protocol. The TLS protocol provides communications privacy over
   the Internet. The protocol allows client/server applications to
   communicate in a way that is designed to prevent eavesdropping,
   tampering, or message forgery.

  http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246

   Abstract

   This document specifies Version 1.2 of the Transport Layer Security
   (TLS) protocol.  The TLS protocol provides communications security
   over the Internet.  The protocol allows client/server applications to
   communicate in a way that is designed to prevent eavesdropping,
   tampering, or message forgery.


What these MITM proxies are doing is _completely_and_thoroughly_
subverting the entire purpose of the TLS protocol.  They're doing
it not by exploiting weaknesses in the TLS protocol itself
(at least prior to rfc5746), but instead, by exploiting a long-standing
fatal design flaw in the security in the existing TLS X.509 PKI trust model.

Those who want a protocol for encrypted communication that can be
arbitrarily MITMed should design themselves such a protocol.
Expecting the IETF to support continued exploitation of a serious
weakness in a security architecture that is the exact opposite of
its stated design goal is inappropriate for the IETF.


-Martin