Re: [therightkey] Basically, it's about keeping the CAs honest

[David Conrad <[e-mail]>]

On Feb 13, 2012, at 8:36 AM, Martin Rex wrote:
> The fact that there are products (client-side HTTPS proxies that
> perform MITM and inspect content) actively sold and used,
> which are vitally dependent on being able to exploit weaknesses
> of the existing TLS X.509 PKI security&trust model, is a sure proof
> that something is wrong with the existing security model.

Well, it is proof that the theoretical model in which authorized MITM was disallowed was seen as too limiting. 

> I do not think there is value in maintaining backward compatible
> weaknesses, and personally, I do not mind the slightest about breaking 
> those protocol subverting middle boxes, be it by the use of TLS channel
> bindings, or the checking of DANE TLSA records.

Pragmatically speaking, if you come up with an architecture that disallows people from doing what they want/need to do, they'll either figure out ways around it or not use that architecture. 

Regards,
-drc