Re: [therightkey] Defining CT-for-PKIX and CT-for-DNSSEC

["Richard L. Barnes" <[e-mail]>]

>> CT-for-PKIX helps a web site administrator determine if a trusted CA ever issued a certificate that should not have been issued.  
>> 
>> CT-for-DNSSEC helps a DNS zone administrator determine whether a DNS server in the hierarchy above the leaf zone ever included a DS record that should not have been included.
>> 
>> It would be good to have agreement on the above; feel free to offer changes and see if the authors agree. Then we can talk about the relationship between the two.
>> 
> 
> Sounds reasonable to me.
> 
> Does "CT" need to be renamed for DNSSEC? Since we're talking about 
> transparency of delegation records/keys and not X.509 certificates. 
> If C means "certification" in the general sense, then I suppose it
> might still be applicable since a (signed) DS record certifies the
> authenticity of the secure entry point key in a subordinate zone.

"DST"?

The definitions sound reasonable, but I'm at a loss as to why you would bother with "CT-for-DNSSEC".  The whole point of CT is that the space of X.509 issuers is very large, and the certificates can be presented by any server on the Internet.    It's a hassle to check every, say, HTTPS server on the Internet to see if a cert with your name is being provided.

In DNSSEC, the set of "issuers" is very small (parent domains), and the DS records originate from a well-defined set of sources (authoritative servers for those domains).  Checking those servers is not that much more difficult than checking a CT log, and doesn't require any new protocol.