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Re: [therightkey] Basically, it's about keeping the CAs honest

Carl Wallace <carl@redhoundsoftware.com> Wed, 15 February 2012 03:15 UTC

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Date: Tue, 14 Feb 2012 22:15:49 -0500
From: Carl Wallace <carl@redhoundsoftware.com>
To: Paul Lambert <paul@marvell.com>
Message-ID: <CB608CB1.12EE2%carl@redhoundsoftware.com>
Thread-Topic: [therightkey] Basically, it's about keeping the CAs honest
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Subject: Re: [therightkey] Basically, it's about keeping the CAs honest
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On 2/14/12 10:04 PM, "Paul Lambert" <paul@marvell.com> wrote:

><snip>
>Ok. This is interesting topic.  If I accept a random certificate it
>should 
>be able to be constrained by the user/admin to a specific range of usage.
>For TLS and classic PKI, this would be a range of DNS names.
>
>Right now, all the root certs in my store can create certificates in
>most any range.  A fundamental principle we need to consider is local
>end-point constraint of trust.
>
>If I could do this - then the random root cert that I accept for
>your signature could be locally constrained to be just for you or
>a small domain range (e.g. an enterprise)

Yep.  There are specs that enable this (RFCs 5914 and 5937) but they are
not in wide use.

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