[therightkey] Basically, it's about keeping the CAs honest

[Nico Williams <[e-mail]>]

Whether we pursue auditable CAs / notaries, Convergence, HSTS, user
authentication that can do channel binding -- all these options are
about keeping the CAs honest by making it too likely that MITMing CAs
(whether compromised or by business plan) will get detected.  Someone
made a comment about elegance.  I'm not sure that anything other than
making CAs auditable is elegant, but I don't think elegance is really
what we're after (though elegance is always nice).  I think we're
after a PKI where MITMing is not likely to pay off except in
relatively rare circumstances (e.g., when a new device is
bootstrapping itself), so rare that it isn't worth trying to MITM even
in those very few cases.

That would make me like PKI.

Nico
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