Re: [TLS] OPTLS: Signature-less TLS 1.3

[Martin Thomson <[e-mail]>]

On 10 November 2014 14:23, Daniel Kahn Gillmor <[e-mail]> wrote:
> i agree that X.509 is a disaster here, but i think making up a new
> delegation protocol won't necessarily be a non-disaster -- we could
> instead just rehash some of the sharp bits of the X.509 mess
> (revocation, duration, transparency, identity, etc) in a different
> format if we're not clear about what we're doing :/

Prior to the discussion yesterday, I was really warming to this idea.
After it, particularly the discussion around the creation of a
delegation point, I think that I've been convinced that we shouldn't
do this.

Aside fro the delegation advantage, the real benefits of this are
largely seen in the short term for RSA certificates.  Moving to ECDSA
obviates one of the big performance advantages, and the concerns
around getting delegation right make me now against pursuing this.

I don't think that this is categorically bad, or that we should not do
this ever, but it's a big change and one that is much harder to get
right than I originally thought.