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Re: [TLS] Unifying tickets and sessions

Viktor Dukhovni <ietf-dane@dukhovni.org> Tue, 21 October 2014 16:34 UTC

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Date: Tue, 21 Oct 2014 16:34:14 +0000
From: Viktor Dukhovni <ietf-dane@dukhovni.org>
To: tls@ietf.org
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References: <2A0EFB9C05D0164E98F19BB0AF3708C71D3A8C48AF@USMBX1.msg.corp.akamai.com> <5445775E.3050108@fussenegger.info> <54458113.1050304@polarssl.org> <20141020235832.GK19158@mournblade.imrryr.org> <544606E5.2070807@fussenegger.info>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Unifying tickets and sessions
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On Tue, Oct 21, 2014 at 09:10:29AM +0200, Richard Fussenegger, BSc wrote:

> I was to vague in regards to implementation, sorry. Of course we only want a
> single key or rather one long blob of random data to manage. The idea of
> using a key length of at least the 'highest supported ciphers'[*] sounds
> very good to me and would honor the ciphers in use. By always using a 128
> bit key (current OpenSSL implementation) higher ciphers are essentially
> downgraded.

OpenSSL gives applications the freedom to use alternative keys and algorithms:

    http://www.postfix.org/postconf.5.html#tls_session_ticket_cipher

For now Postfix defaults to aes-128-cbc, I might change the default
to aes-256-cbc before 2.12 ships.

-- 
	Viktor.

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