Re: [TLS] Consensus call for keys used in handshake and data messages
mrex@sap.com (Martin Rex) Fri, 17 June 2016 17:23 UTC
Return-Path: <mrex@sap.com>
X-Original-To: tls@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: tls@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id BB1AA12D8D8 for <tls@ietfa.amsl.com>; Fri, 17 Jun 2016 10:23:33 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -6.922
X-Spam-Level:
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-6.922 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_HI=-5, RCVD_IN_MSPIKE_H3=-0.01, RCVD_IN_MSPIKE_WL=-0.01, SPF_HELO_PASS=-0.001, SPF_PASS=-0.001] autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id XaG_6TosjXj1 for <tls@ietfa.amsl.com>; Fri, 17 Jun 2016 10:23:32 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from smtpde01.smtp.sap-ag.de (smtpde01.smtp.sap-ag.de [155.56.68.170]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher AECDH-AES256-SHA (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id D997612D866 for <tls@ietf.org>; Fri, 17 Jun 2016 10:23:31 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from mail06.wdf.sap.corp (mail06.sap.corp [194.39.131.54]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtpde01.smtp.sap-ag.de (Postfix) with ESMTPS id F412B2AA5E; Fri, 17 Jun 2016 19:23:29 +0200 (CEST)
X-purgate-ID: 152705::1466184210-0000299C-C009CC09/0/0
X-purgate-size: 866
X-purgate: clean
X-purgate: This mail is considered clean (visit http://www.eleven.de for further information)
X-purgate-Ad: Categorized by eleven eXpurgate (R) http://www.eleven.de
X-purgate-type: clean
X-SAP-SPAM-Status: clean
Received: from ld9781.wdf.sap.corp (ld9781.wdf.sap.corp [10.21.82.193]) by mail06.wdf.sap.corp (Postfix) with ESMTP id 9FA0B4EB156; Fri, 17 Jun 2016 19:23:28 +0200 (CEST)
Received: by ld9781.wdf.sap.corp (Postfix, from userid 10159) id A30D41A4EA; Fri, 17 Jun 2016 19:23:28 +0200 (CEST)
In-Reply-To: <87mvmlw1qv.fsf@alice.fifthhorseman.net>
To: Daniel Kahn Gillmor <dkg@fifthhorseman.net>
Date: Fri, 17 Jun 2016 19:23:28 +0200
X-Mailer: ELM [version 2.4ME+ PL125 (25)]
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="US-ASCII"
Message-Id: <20160617172328.A30D41A4EA@ld9781.wdf.sap.corp>
From: mrex@sap.com
Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/tls/-NmxduH8qcgdS_5jsP0o-WeZKAY>
Cc: tls@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [TLS] Consensus call for keys used in handshake and data messages
X-BeenThere: tls@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.17
Precedence: list
Reply-To: mrex@sap.com
List-Id: "This is the mailing list for the Transport Layer Security working group of the IETF." <tls.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/tls>, <mailto:tls-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/tls/>
List-Post: <mailto:tls@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:tls-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls>, <mailto:tls-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Fri, 17 Jun 2016 17:23:34 -0000
Daniel Kahn Gillmor wrote: > On Thu 2016-06-16 11:26:14 -0400, Hubert Kario wrote: >> wasn't that rejected because it breaks boxes that do passive monitoring >> of connections? (and so expect TLS packets on specific ports, killing >> connection if they don't look like TLS packets) > > We're talking about the possibility of changing the TLS record framing > anyway, which would kill the simplest of those boxes. One theory is if > you're going to make such a break, you might as well pull the band aid > off in one fell swoop. While I dislike monitoring boxes and hate intercepting proxies, changing of the TLS record framing (and hiding the ContentType) is going to break _the_endpoints_. If TLSv1.3 does that, its adoption curve will make IPv6 adoption appear fast by comparison. Please stop messing with the TLS record format. -Martin
- Re: [TLS] Consensus call for keys used in handsha… Eric Rescorla
- Re: [TLS] Consensus call for keys used in handsha… Will Serumgard
- Re: [TLS] Consensus call for keys used in handsha… Björn Tackmann
- Re: [TLS] Consensus call for keys used in handsha… Subodh Iyengar
- Re: [TLS] Consensus call for keys used in handsha… Ilari Liusvaara
- Re: [TLS] Consensus call for keys used in handsha… Dave Garrett
- Re: [TLS] Consensus call for keys used in handsha… Colm MacCárthaigh
- Re: [TLS] Consensus call for keys used in handsha… Eric Rescorla
- Re: [TLS] Consensus call for keys used in handsha… Daniel Kahn Gillmor
- Re: [TLS] Consensus call for keys used in handsha… Hugo Krawczyk
- Re: [TLS] Consensus call for keys used in handsha… Martin Rex
- Re: [TLS] Consensus call for keys used in handsha… Paterson, Kenny
- Re: [TLS] Consensus call for keys used in handsha… Paterson, Kenny
- Re: [TLS] Consensus call for keys used in handsha… Ilari Liusvaara
- Re: [TLS] Consensus call for keys used in handsha… Daniel Kahn Gillmor
- Re: [TLS] Consensus call for keys used in handsha… Hubert Kario
- Re: [TLS] Consensus call for keys used in handsha… Dave Garrett
- Re: [TLS] Consensus call for keys used in handsha… Daniel Kahn Gillmor
- Re: [TLS] Consensus call for keys used in handsha… Nick Sullivan
- Re: [TLS] Consensus call for keys used in handsha… Dan Harkins
- Re: [TLS] Consensus call for keys used in handsha… Ilari Liusvaara
- Re: [TLS] Consensus call for keys used in handsha… Daniel Kahn Gillmor
- Re: [TLS] Consensus call for keys used in handsha… Yoav Nir
- Re: [TLS] Consensus call for keys used in handsha… Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos
- Re: [TLS] Consensus call for keys used in handsha… Benjamin Dowling
- Re: [TLS] Consensus call for keys used in handsha… Ilari Liusvaara
- Re: [TLS] Consensus call for keys used in handsha… Felix Günther
- Re: [TLS] Consensus call for keys used in handsha… Björn Tackmann
- Re: [TLS] Consensus call for keys used in handsha… Martin Thomson
- Re: [TLS] Consensus call for keys used in handsha… Yoav Nir
- Re: [TLS] Consensus call for keys used in handsha… Watson Ladd
- Re: [TLS] Consensus call for keys used in handsha… Blumenthal, Uri - 0553 - MITLL
- Re: [TLS] Consensus call for keys used in handsha… Henrik Grubbström
- Re: [TLS] Consensus call for keys used in handsha… Hannes Mehnert
- Re: [TLS] Consensus call for keys used in handsha… Cas Cremers
- Re: [TLS] Consensus call for keys used in handsha… Eric Rescorla
- [TLS] Consensus call for keys used in handshake a… Joseph Salowey
- Re: [TLS] Consensus call for keys used in handsha… Andrei Popov
- Re: [TLS] Consensus call for keys used in handsha… Karthikeyan Bhargavan