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Re: [TLS] TLS and KCI vulnerable handshakes

Peter Gutmann <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz> Mon, 17 August 2015 15:54 UTC

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From: Peter Gutmann <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz>
To: "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [TLS] TLS and KCI vulnerable handshakes
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Date: Mon, 17 Aug 2015 15:53:59 +0000
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Subject: Re: [TLS] TLS and KCI vulnerable handshakes
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Viktor Dukhovni <ietf-dane@dukhovni.org> writes:

>I can't answer why, but I know what and when:

I was trying to avoid finger-pointing so I didn't go through the changelog to
see whodunnit, I was more interested in the motivation.  Same for Apple, why
would you implement something that pretty much no-one else (at the time)
supported, and for good reason?

Having said that though:

DH-DSS-CAMELLIA256-SHA  SSLv3 Kx=DH/DSS   Au=DH   Enc=Camellia(256) Mac=SHA1
DH-DSS-CAMELLIA128-SHA  SSLv3 Kx=DH/DSS   Au=DH   Enc=Camellia(128) Mac=SHA1
DH-DSS-SEED-SHA         SSLv3 Kx=DH/DSS   Au=DH   Enc=SEED(128) Mac=SHA1
DH-DSS-DES-CBC-SHA      SSLv3 Kx=DH/DSS   Au=DH   Enc=DES(56)   Mac=SHA1
DH-RSA-DES-CBC-SHA      SSLv3 Kx=DH/RSA   Au=DH   Enc=DES(56)   Mac=SHA1

that sort of stuff just compounds the WTF.  Static DH + DSA + single DES, added in 2012.
W. T. F.

Peter.

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