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Re: [TLS] PR #624: Remove Supplemental Auth from TLS 1.3

Sean Turner <sean@sn3rd.com> Thu, 06 October 2016 20:08 UTC

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From: Sean Turner <sean@sn3rd.com>
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Date: Thu, 06 Oct 2016 16:08:03 -0400
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Subject: Re: [TLS] PR #624: Remove Supplemental Auth from TLS 1.3
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All,

It’s time to put this one to bed.  ekr’s going to put back user_mapping for Andrei/MS, but we’re going to ban/orphan the client_authz and server_authz extensions.  If it turns out that there’s some need to later unban/unorphan them, then somebody can write a draft that specifies how they’re used with TLS1.3.

spt

> On Sep 06, 2016, at 23:58, Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com> wrote:
> 
> I agree that client_authz and server_authz have not enjoyed much implementation.
> 
> Russ
> 
> 
> On Sep 3, 2016, at 3:54 PM, Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com> wrote:
> 
>> https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/pull/624
>> 
>> We currently have code points assigned for
>> 
>>  user_mapping [RFC4681]     
>>  client_authz [RFC5878]      
>>  server_authz [RFC5878] 
>> 
>> These aren't well-specified for use in TLS 1.3 and my sense is that they
>> are barely used. Any objections to just banning them? If not, I'll merge this
>> PR end of next week.
>> 
>> -Ekr
> 
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