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Re: [TLS] Broken browser behaviour with SCADA TLS

Colm MacCárthaigh <colm@allcosts.net> Wed, 04 July 2018 15:40 UTC

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From: Colm MacCárthaigh <colm@allcosts.net>
Date: Wed, 04 Jul 2018 08:40:26 -0700
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To: David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>
Cc: Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos <nmav@redhat.com>, "<tls@ietf.org>" <tls@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Broken browser behaviour with SCADA TLS
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On Wed, Jul 4, 2018 at 8:15 AM, David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>
wrote:
>
> Indeed. The bad feedback was not even at a 2048-bit minimum, but a mere
> 1024-bit minimum. (Chrome enabled far more DHE ciphers than others, so we
> encountered a lot of this.) 2048-bit was completely hopeless. At the time
> of removal, 95% of DHE negotiations made by Chrome used a 1024-bit minimum.
> See here for details:
> https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/d/msg/blink-dev/
> ShRaCsYx4lk/46rD81AsBwAJ
>

>From the server side: we found that enforcing a 2048-bit size was
unworkable, it breaks clients that will negotiate DHE but then fail when
the exchange happens, including versions of Java. Because the breakage
happens post-handshake, there was little recourse to fix it. We did look at
fingerprinting the clients and trying to use a different size for those,
but even that led to too high an error rate. So we removed DHE in general
and use ECDHE for FS.

-- 
Colm

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