Re: [TLS] Another [Well-deserved] attack on TLS CCA
Anders Rundgren <anders.rundgren@telia.com> Tue, 18 June 2013 20:45 UTC
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Date: Tue, 18 Jun 2013 22:44:53 +0200
From: Anders Rundgren <anders.rundgren@telia.com>
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To: Nico Williams <nico@cryptonector.com>
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Cc: "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [TLS] Another [Well-deserved] attack on TLS CCA
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On 2013-06-18 22:35, Nico Williams wrote: > BrowserID uses its certificates at the application-layer, not in TLS. > I think that's the correct approach. Yes, so does all usable consumer-auth solutions including Google's U2F. Anders > > (That still leaves the use of TLS server certs for authenticating > servers; that's not going to go away. Ideally mechanisms like > BrowserID can do channel binding so that the dependence on the TLS > server PKI can be mitigated / eventually removed.) > > Nico > -- >
- [TLS] Another [Well-deserved] attack on TLS CCA Anders Rundgren
- Re: [TLS] Another [Well-deserved] attack on TLS C… Adam Langley
- Re: [TLS] Another [Well-deserved] attack on TLS C… Anders Rundgren
- Re: [TLS] Another [Well-deserved] attack on TLS C… Nico Williams
- Re: [TLS] Another [Well-deserved] attack on TLS C… Anders Rundgren
- Re: [TLS] Another [Well-deserved] attack on TLS C… Geoffrey Keating
- Re: [TLS] Another [Well-deserved] attack on TLS C… Anders Rundgren
- Re: [TLS] Another [Well-deserved] attack on TLS C… Geoffrey Keating
- Re: [TLS] Another [Well-deserved] attack on TLS C… Anders Rundgren