[TLS] Martin Duke's No Objection on draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id-11: (with COMMENT)

[Martin Duke via Datatracker <[e-mail]>]

Martin Duke has entered the following ballot position for
draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id-11: No Objection

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COMMENT:
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Thanks for this document.

Section 9.3.3 of quic-transport, which deals with basically the same security
model, also requires the receiving endpoint to probe the original address, not
just the new one, to address a somewhat more difficult attack. It would be good
to at least RECOMMEND this behavior for DTLS applications, and/or
(repeat/informatively reference) the logic there.