RE: [TLS] Review of draft-ietf-tls-openpgp-keys-08

Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos wrote:
> > If Alice signs (certifies) Bob's key, and Bob signs Carol's key,
> > isn't that a certificate chain? (The whole notion of "web of trust"
> > seems to imply a certificate graph, which again implies chains...)
> 
> Indeed that's true.But it is also not very practical to include
> signers in the key sent. That is because a key might be signed by
> tens or hundrends of keys, that are not compact either. I also see
> not much usage of the extra keys. The typical way for the receipient
> to verify an openpgp key is by retrieving by himself the required
> chain, if needed.

All this ("typical way" etc, "might be signed by tens", ..) seems to
indicate that usually a single certificate is enough, but there may
be situations where several would be useful. In other words, the 
situation is not that different from X.509, and we should keep the 
Certificate payload as a list...

> A similar matter was discussed in the early days of the draft... 
> i just found a link:
> http://www.mhonarc.org/archive/html/ietf-openpgp/1997-12/msg00105.html

Thanks for the pointer; it looks like Eric raised exactly this issue
already over 8 years ago!

Best regards,
Pasi

_______________________________________________
TLS mailing list
TLS@lists.ietf.org
https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls