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Re: [TLS] Support of integrity only cipher suites in TLS 1.3

Harlan Lieberman-Berg <hlieberman@setec.io> Tue, 04 April 2017 05:09 UTC

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From: Harlan Lieberman-Berg <hlieberman@setec.io>
To: "Fries, Steffen" <steffen.fries@siemens.com>, TLS WG <tls@ietf.org>
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Date: Tue, 04 Apr 2017 01:09:48 -0400
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Support of integrity only cipher suites in TLS 1.3
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"Fries, Steffen" <steffen.fries@siemens.com> writes:
> The reason I'm asking is that in industrial communication it is often
> sufficient to have source authentication and message integrity while
> probes on the network are still able to monitor the traffic for
> certain properties or verify allowed exchanges.

Hello Steffen,

We've had a couple of discussions about this on the mailing list before.
(See especially the "Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3" email thread
starting with DM5PR11MB1419B782D2BEF0E0A35E420DF4C90@DM5PR11MB1419.namprd11.prod.outlook.com).
At this point, I don't think there's much of an appetite to be adding
support for null-encryption cipher suites into TLS 1.3.

In a quick summary of the 100+ message thread, the impression I got from
the conversation was that the WG feels there's too much foot-gun
potential from null cipher suites and that the risk was too high and the
concerns brought up too late.

Sincerely,
-- 
Harlan Lieberman-Berg
~hlieberman

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