Re: [TLS] Last call comments and WG Chair review of draft-ietf-tls-ecdhe-psk-aead

[Daniel Migault <[e-mail]>]

Hi Joe,

Thanks for the reminder. I just posted it. Let me know if there is anything
I have to do.

Yours,
Daniel

On Tue, Apr 11, 2017 at 11:21 AM, Joseph Salowey <[e-mail]> wrote:

> Hi Daniel,
>
> Please submit a revised draft with the changes below.
>
> Thanks,
>
> Joe
>
>
> On Tue, Mar 21, 2017 at 11:08 AM, Daniel Migault <
> [e-mail]> wrote:
>
>> Hi,
>>
>> Thank you for the review and comments received. Given the discussion our
>> understanding was that the consensus was to remove CCM-256 so that suites
>> defined by the document apply both for TLS1.2 as well as for TLS1.3. The
>> draft available on github [1
>> <https://github.com/mglt/draft-ietf-tls-ecdhe-psk-aead/blob/master/draft-ietf-tls-ecdhe-psk-aead>]
>> has been updated as follows:
>>
>>
>> 1.  Why does TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8_SHA256 use SHA256 instead
>> of SHA384 like the other 256 bit cipher suites? (From Russ Housley)
>>
>> MGLT: This was a mistake in the IANA section. The cypher suite was
>> correct in the remaining text. However, the current version does not
>> consider anymore CCM-256* which also solves this issue.
>>
>> 2.  Since the security considerations mention passwords (human chosen
>> secrets) it should mention dictionary attacks. (From Russ Housley)
>>
>> MGLT: The issue of human chosen passwords and dictionary attacks has been
>> mentioned in the security consideration with the following text:
>>
>> """
>>    Use of Pre-Shared Keys of limited entropy may allow an active
>>    attacker attempts to connect to the server and tries different keys.
>>    For example, limited entropy may be provided by using short PSK in
>>    which case an attacker may perform a brute-force attack.  Other
>>    example includes the use of a PSK chosen by a human and thus may be
>>    exposed to dictionary attacks.
>> """
>>
>>
>> 3.  Section 2 and 3 of the document contains more detail about TLS 1.3
>> than necessary.
>>
>> Section 2: This document only defines cipher suites for TLS 1.2, not TLS
>> 1.2 or later.  A subset of equivalent cipher suites is defined in the TLS
>> 1.3 specification.
>>
>> MGLT: CCM-256 has been removed from the specification so that suites can
>> be defined for TLS 1.2 as well as TLS1.3. The following text is considered.
>>
>> """
>>    This document defines new cipher suites that provide Pre-Shared Key
>>    (PSK) authentication, Perfect Forward Secrecy (PFS), and
>>    Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data (AEAD).  The cipher
>>    suites are defined for version 1.2 of the Transport Layer Security
>>    (TLS) [RFC5246] protocol, version 1.2 of the Datagram Transport Layer
>>    Security (DTLS) protocol [RFC6347], as well as version 1.3 of TLS
>>    [I-D.ietf-tls-tls13].
>> """
>>
>> Section 3 and 4: Maybe replace the last 2 paragraphs with an addition to
>> section 4 that states:
>>
>> "TLS 1.3 and above name, negotiate and support a subset of these cipher
>> suites in a different way."  (TLS 1.3 does not support
>> TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CCM_SHA384 and TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CCM
>> _8_SHA256)
>>
>> MGLT: As CCM-256 has been removed, we do not have to deal with the
>> situation where TLS1.3 only considers a subset of the suites defined for
>> TLS1.2.
>>
>> The following sentence in section 3 clarifies that codes points are only
>> defined for TLS1.2: “””The assigned code points can only be used for TLS
>> 1.2.”””. The description of the TLS1.3 negotiation has been limited in
>> section 4 to the following sentence: “””TLS 1.3 and above version,
>> negotiate and support these cipher suites in a different way.”””
>>
>> 4. Section 3 should contain a bit more detail about relationship to 4492
>> bis and RFC 4279:
>>
>> Something like the following may be enough.
>>
>> "This messages and pre-master secret construction in this document are
>> based on [RFC4279].  The elliptic curve parameters used in in the
>> Diffie-Hellman parameters are negotiated using extensions defined in
>> [4492-bis]."
>>
>> MGLT: The sentence mentioned above has been added with [4492-bis]
>> mentioned as normative.
>> “””
>>     Messages and pre-master secret construction in this document are
>>    based on [RFC4279].  The elliptic curve parameters used in in the
>>    Diffie-Hellman parameters are negotiated using extensions defined in
>>    [I-D.ietf-tls-rfc4492bis].
>> “””
>>
>> [1] https://github.com/mglt/draft-ietf-tls-ecdhe-psk-aead/blob/m
>> aster/draft-ietf-tls-ecdhe-psk-aead
>>
>> Yours,
>> Daniel and John
>>
>>
>> On Tue, Feb 21, 2017 at 1:22 PM, Joseph Salowey <[e-mail]> wrote:
>>
>>> Here are the open issues for draft-ietf-tls-ecdhe-psk-aead
>>>
>>> 1.  Why does TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8_SHA256 use SHA256 instead
>>> of SHA384 like the other 256 bit cipher suites? (From Russ Housley)
>>>
>>> 2.  Since the security considerations mention passwords (human chosen
>>> secrets) it should mention dictionary attacks. (From Russ Housley)
>>>
>>> 3.  Section 2 and 3 of the document contains more detail about TLS 1.3
>>> than necessary.
>>>
>>> Section 2: This document only defines cipher suites for TLS 1.2, not TLS
>>> 1.2 or later.  A subset of equivalent cipher suites is defined in the TLS
>>> 1.3 specification.
>>>
>>> Section 3 and 4: Maybe replace the last 2 paragraphs with an addition to
>>> section 4 that states:
>>>
>>> "TLS 1.3 and above name, negotiate and support a subset of these cipher
>>> suites in a different way."  (TLS 1.3 does not support
>>> TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CCM_SHA384 and TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256
>>> _CCM_8_SHA256)
>>>
>>> 4. Section 3 should contain a bit more detail about relationship to 4492
>>> bis and RFC 4279:
>>>
>>> Something like the following may be enough.
>>>
>>> "This messages and pre-master secret construction in this document are
>>> based on [RFC4279].  The elliptic curve parameters used in in the
>>> Diffie-Hellman parameters are negotiated using extensions defined in
>>> [4492-bis]."
>>>
>>> Thanks,
>>>
>>> Joe
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> _______________________________________________
>>> TLS mailing list
>>> [e-mail]
>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>>>
>>>
>>
>
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