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Re: [TLS] Security review of TLS1.3 0-RTT

Colm MacCárthaigh <colm@allcosts.net> Thu, 04 May 2017 01:41 UTC

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From: Colm MacCárthaigh <colm@allcosts.net>
Date: Wed, 03 May 2017 18:41:05 -0700
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To: Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com>
Cc: Martin Thomson <martin.thomson@gmail.com>, "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Security review of TLS1.3 0-RTT
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On Wed, May 3, 2017 at 6:11 PM, Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> Historically TLS protected against replay attacks. Now it doesn't. An
> application that relies on this property which TLS used to guarantee
> is now broken. Clearly we could have provided it, we just chose not
> to.
>

And that choice is insecure. If it's to be kept, I'd suggest renaming the
protocol.

-- 
Colm

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