Re: [TLS] Downgrade protection, fallbacks, and server time

Viktor Dukhovni <ietf-dane@dukhovni.org> Thu, 02 June 2016 15:33 UTC

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Subject: Re: [TLS] Downgrade protection, fallbacks, and server time
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> On Jun 2, 2016, at 11:16 AM, David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>; wrote:
> 
> I've mused on something like that (I was the main driver behind painstakingly removing the existing version fallback in Chrome), but I don't think non-determinism is a good idea. Site owners need to be able to reproduce the failures their users see.
> 
> But, yes, I will of course be monitoring the true metrics (my probing a list of sites is only an approximation) and seeing what can be done here, as I did previously.

Opening a new window or tab and trying again a couple of times is not
a major reproducibility barrier.  The odds of failure would increase
with time, and would not be small to start with.

It would be important to roll the dice just once for a given site within
a given window or tab (at least until the user navigates to a new domain)
so that once contact is successful, further disruption does not render the
site unusable.  Basically, resume with the highest protocol that worked
consistently until such state is safe to flush, but reduce the odds of
initial success over a well publicized time-frame.

-- 
	Viktor.