[TLS] RSA-PSS in TLS 1.3
Joseph Salowey <joe@salowey.net> Mon, 29 February 2016 17:32 UTC
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From: Joseph Salowey <joe@salowey.net>
Date: Mon, 29 Feb 2016 09:32:04 -0800
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Subject: [TLS] RSA-PSS in TLS 1.3
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We seem to have good consensus on moving to RSA-PSS and away from PKCS-1.5 in TLS 1.3. However, there is a problem that it may take some hardware implementations some time to move to RSA-PSS. After an off list discussion with a few folks here is a proposal for moving forward. We make RSA-PSS mandatory to implement (MUST implement instead of MUST offer). Clients can advertise support for PKCS-1.5 for backwards compatibility in the transition period. Please respond on the list on whether you think this is a reasonable way forward or not. Thanks, J&S
- Re: [TLS] RSA-PSS in TLS 1.3 Andrey Jivsov
- Re: [TLS] RSA-PSS in TLS 1.3 Russ Housley
- Re: [TLS] RSA-PSS in TLS 1.3 Joseph Salowey
- Re: [TLS] RSA-PSS in TLS 1.3 Yoav Nir
- Re: [TLS] RSA-PSS in TLS 1.3 Hanno Böck
- [TLS] RSA-PSS in TLS 1.3 Joseph Salowey
- Re: [TLS] RSA-PSS in TLS 1.3 Viktor Dukhovni
- Re: [TLS] RSA-PSS in TLS 1.3 Benjamin Beurdouche
- Re: [TLS] RSA-PSS in TLS 1.3 Yoav Nir
- Re: [TLS] RSA-PSS in TLS 1.3 Brian Smith
- Re: [TLS] RSA-PSS in TLS 1.3 Andrey Jivsov
- Re: [TLS] RSA-PSS in TLS 1.3 Salz, Rich
- Re: [TLS] RSA-PSS in TLS 1.3 Andrey Jivsov
- Re: [TLS] RSA-PSS in TLS 1.3 Dave Garrett
- Re: [TLS] RSA-PSS in TLS 1.3 Hanno Böck
- Re: [TLS] RSA-PSS in TLS 1.3 Andrey Jivsov
- Re: [TLS] RSA-PSS in TLS 1.3 Martin Thomson
- Re: [TLS] RSA-PSS in TLS 1.3 Viktor Dukhovni
- Re: [TLS] RSA-PSS in TLS 1.3 Viktor Dukhovni
- Re: [TLS] RSA-PSS in TLS 1.3 Martin Thomson
- Re: [TLS] RSA-PSS in TLS 1.3 Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos
- Re: [TLS] RSA-PSS in TLS 1.3 Yoav Nir
- Re: [TLS] RSA-PSS in TLS 1.3 Yoav Nir
- Re: [TLS] RSA-PSS in TLS 1.3 Alyssa Rowan
- Re: [TLS] RSA-PSS in TLS 1.3 Watson Ladd
- Re: [TLS] RSA-PSS in TLS 1.3 Viktor Dukhovni
- Re: [TLS] RSA-PSS in TLS 1.3 Yoav Nir
- Re: [TLS] RSA-PSS in TLS 1.3 Hanno Böck
- Re: [TLS] RSA-PSS in TLS 1.3 Martin Thomson
- Re: [TLS] RSA-PSS in TLS 1.3 Andrey Jivsov
- Re: [TLS] RSA-PSS in TLS 1.3 Yoav Nir
- Re: [TLS] RSA-PSS in TLS 1.3 Viktor Dukhovni
- Re: [TLS] RSA-PSS in TLS 1.3 Rob Stradling
- Re: [TLS] RSA-PSS in TLS 1.3 Rob Stradling
- Re: [TLS] RSA-PSS in TLS 1.3 Yoav Nir
- Re: [TLS] RSA-PSS in TLS 1.3 Eric Rescorla
- Re: [TLS] RSA-PSS in TLS 1.3 Yoav Nir
- Re: [TLS] RSA-PSS in TLS 1.3 Dave Garrett
- Re: [TLS] RSA-PSS in TLS 1.3 Dang, Quynh (Fed)
- Re: [TLS] RSA-PSS in TLS 1.3 Hanno Böck
- Re: [TLS] RSA-PSS in TLS 1.3 Dang, Quynh (Fed)
- Re: [TLS] RSA-PSS in TLS 1.3 Blumenthal, Uri - 0553 - MITLL
- Re: [TLS] RSA-PSS in TLS 1.3 Hanno Böck
- Re: [TLS] RSA-PSS in TLS 1.3 Dang, Quynh (Fed)
- Re: [TLS] RSA-PSS in TLS 1.3 Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos
- Re: [TLS] RSA-PSS in TLS 1.3 Martin Rex
- Re: [TLS] RSA-PSS in TLS 1.3 Scott Fluhrer (sfluhrer)
- Re: [TLS] RSA-PSS in TLS 1.3 Hanno Böck
- Re: [TLS] RSA-PSS in TLS 1.3 Martin Rex
- Re: [TLS] RSA-PSS in TLS 1.3 Fedor Brunner
- Re: [TLS] RSA-PSS in TLS 1.3 Martin Rex
- Re: [TLS] RSA-PSS in TLS 1.3 Hubert Kario
- Re: [TLS] RSA-PSS in TLS 1.3 Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos
- Re: [TLS] RSA-PSS in TLS 1.3 Hannes Mehnert
- Re: [TLS] RSA-PSS in TLS 1.3 Scott Fluhrer (sfluhrer)
- Re: [TLS] RSA-PSS in TLS 1.3 Ilari Liusvaara
- Re: [TLS] RSA-PSS in TLS 1.3 Scott Fluhrer (sfluhrer)
- Re: [TLS] RSA-PSS in TLS 1.3 Scott Fluhrer (sfluhrer)
- Re: [TLS] RSA-PSS in TLS 1.3 Hubert Kario
- Re: [TLS] RSA-PSS in TLS 1.3 Tony Arcieri
- [TLS] (TLS1.3 - algorithm agility support is enou… Rene Struik
- Re: [TLS] (TLS1.3 - algorithm agility support is … Blumenthal, Uri - 0553 - MITLL
- Re: [TLS] (TLS1.3 - algorithm agility support is … Scott Fluhrer (sfluhrer)
- Re: [TLS] RSA-PSS in TLS 1.3 Scott Fluhrer (sfluhrer)
- Re: [TLS] RSA-PSS in TLS 1.3 Hubert Kario
- Re: [TLS] RSA-PSS in TLS 1.3 Viktor Dukhovni
- Re: [TLS] RSA-PSS in TLS 1.3 Hubert Kario
- Re: [TLS] RSA-PSS in TLS 1.3 Tony Arcieri