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Re: [TLS] Confirming consensus: TLS1.3->TLS*

Viktor Dukhovni <ietf-dane@dukhovni.org> Mon, 21 November 2016 04:26 UTC

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From: Viktor Dukhovni <ietf-dane@dukhovni.org>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Confirming consensus: TLS1.3->TLS*
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> On Nov 20, 2016, at 7:56 PM, D. J. Bernstein <djb@cr.yp.to> wrote:
> 
> Of course people who prioritize retaining the existing "TLS 1.3"
> mindshare will be just as unhappy with "TLS 2017" as with "TLS 4", but
> they'll get over it within a few years. :-)

This worked well enough for IDNA2003 and IDNA2008 (the latter was
finally published in 2010, and even that is not a problem).

So I can get behind TLS 2017.  I had even considered suggesting it,
but did not at the time want to add more options to the mix.

I think the risk of two TLS standards published in a single year
is vanishingly low.  And see no problems with "gaps" in the numbers.

-- 
	Viktor.

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