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Re: [TLS] chairs - please shutdown wiretapping discussion...

Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie> Tue, 11 July 2017 21:21 UTC

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To: Yoav Nir <ynir.ietf@gmail.com>, Christian Huitema <huitema@huitema.net>
Cc: Ted Lemon <mellon@fugue.com>, tls@ietf.org
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From: Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] chairs - please shutdown wiretapping discussion...
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On 11/07/17 22:10, Yoav Nir wrote:
> If one of the parties to a conversation cooperates with the wiretap,
> this isn’t an attack.
Lemme try on this one again from a different angle.

In classic telephony wiretaps the carrier does the
tap. There are similar situations with TLS...

In hosted platforms (e.g. wordpress.com and many
others) where the senders and receivers (or publishers
& readers) have read and write access via PHP code
and not via a shell, and cannot therefore control web
or TLS configuration, the platform would be doing a
wiretap if it turned this on, whilst colluding with
or being coerced by some other entity that collects
and later decrypts the ciphertext and packets.

Are we agreed that that use-case is wiretapping via
this mechanism?

There are many millions of people who use such
constrained hosted environments.

Cheers,
S.

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