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Re: [TLS] Remove EncryptedExtensions from 0-RTT

Martin Thomson <martin.thomson@gmail.com> Thu, 23 June 2016 20:59 UTC

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From: Martin Thomson <martin.thomson@gmail.com>
Date: Fri, 24 Jun 2016 06:59:28 +1000
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To: David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Remove EncryptedExtensions from 0-RTT
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On 24 June 2016 at 01:05, David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org> wrote:
> I don't think this matters. Just don't reuse tickets. But, if we cared, per
> the "dumbest possible thing that might work" school of thought, we can
> replace XOR with addition modulo 2^32. Now ticket reuse leaks the delta
> between two ClientHellos, which, precision aside, was already public
> information from the receive time (with ticket as correlator). The timestamp
> of the ticket-minting connection is as secret as before.

That sounds like fine reasoning to me.  XOR or addition are both easy
enough to specify.

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