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Re: [TLS] Alternative ESNI?

Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com> Sat, 15 December 2018 21:27 UTC

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From: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
Date: Sat, 15 Dec 2018 13:27:04 -0800
Message-ID: <CABcZeBNh10vX3DKMbo+sve38g5SqcMq3PsvX7fxQWDShV01yvg@mail.gmail.com>
To: Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>
Cc: IETF TLS WG <tls@ietf.org>, Viktor Dukhovni <ietf-dane@dukhovni.org>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Alternative ESNI?
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On Sat, Dec 15, 2018 at 12:41 PM Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>
wrote:

> If browsers found one of the schemes attractive and the other
> not, that'd I think be a winning argument - unfortunately, but
> realistically, that'd win all arguments about trade-offs in
> terms of potential for privacy improvement.
>

I can't speak for anyone else, but as I said, we discussed this topic during
the initial design phase of TLS 1.3 and the conclusion was that taking
an extra round trip to get ESNI was prohibitive and that people wouldn't
be willing to turn it on by default (and we ultimately hope that ever TLS
connection will have ESNI). do not believe Firefox would be willing
to do so. Perhaps otehr browsers feel differently.

-Ekr

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