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Re: [TLS] Make DANE-TLS (RFC 6698) mandatory for TLS

"Rene 'Renne' Bartsch, B.Sc. Informatics" <ietf@bartschnet.de> Tue, 16 October 2018 14:01 UTC

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From: "Rene 'Renne' Bartsch, B.Sc. Informatics" <ietf@bartschnet.de>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Make DANE-TLS (RFC 6698) mandatory for TLS
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Unjust certificates can be bought for 150,- $ in the darknet which makes TLS snake-oil. And you never know if the internet provider is hostile or hacked.
So we should act in the favor of end-users. If we don't have the position to make DANE mandatory, yet, we should at least try to encourage browser vendors
to support DANE. Just think about all the online-banking websites without DNSSEC/DANE protection.


Am 15.10.18 um 22:49 schrieb Viktor Dukhovni:
> Though I am generally an advocate for DANE, and have done much work to
> further its adoption, this is not a realistic proposal.  DANE adoption
> in TLS will be incremental and will not be accomplished via a mandate.
> 
>> On Oct 15, 2018, at 4:20 PM, Rene 'Renne' Bartsch, B.Sc. Informatics <ietf=40bartschnet.de@dmarc.ietf.org> wrote:
>>
>> TLS is prone to Man-In-The-Middle attacks with unjustly obtained intermediate certificates (e.g. firewall appliances).
>> The DNSSEC KSK-rollover worked like a charm.
>>
>> So I suggest to make DANE-TLS mandatory for TLS to prevent Man-In-The-Middle attacks with unjustly obtained intermediate certificates.
> 
> If you want to see more DANE deployment, work on tooling to ease
> DNSSEC deployment, convince registries to support CDS and CDS0,
> simplify zone signing and key rollover interfaces in nameserver
> implementations, develop monitoring tools, ...  Get efforts to
> improve the tools funded, ...
> 
> There is much work to be done, before we can expect ubiquitous
> DNSSEC support, let alone DANE.  DNSSEC deployment is concentrated
> at domains hosted by providers who have invested in automating it.
> To bring it to the masses, it must be something that works out of
> the box.
> 
> Until then it should be possible to use DNSSEC and DANE with TLS,
> but we're quite far from being in a position to mandate their use.
>

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