Re: [TLS] Last Call: <draft-ietf-tls-downgrade-scsv-03.txt> (TLS Fallback Signaling Cipher Suite Value (SCSV) for Preventing Protocol Downgrade Attacks) to Proposed Standard
Michael Clark <michael@metaparadigm.com> Fri, 23 January 2015 03:48 UTC
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Date: Fri, 23 Jan 2015 11:48:15 +0800
From: Michael Clark <michael@metaparadigm.com>
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To: "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>, Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos <nmav@redhat.com>, Dave Garrett <davemgarrett@gmail.com>, Bodo Moeller <bmoeller@acm.org>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Last Call: <draft-ietf-tls-downgrade-scsv-03.txt> (TLS Fallback Signaling Cipher Suite Value (SCSV) for Preventing Protocol Downgrade Attacks) to Proposed Standard
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On 23/1/15 10:33 am, Michael Clark wrote: > However this is my thinking, which was modified by the comments of others. > > A). > > 1). Codify use of a "Supported TLS Versions Extension" with either > a strong recommendation for a minimum of TLSv1.0 { 3, 1 } to deprecate > SSLv3.0 > * Advisory to recommend the record layer ClientHello version > be fixed to the lower bound { 3, 0 } ; which there seems to be some > consensus for > * In the case where the extension is echoed. i.e. supported, > the record layer version is echoed by the server and signed in the > handshake. > * This is TLSv1.0 through TLSv1.2 compatible via extension > tolerance. i.e. All TLS implementations can benefit from it. > > And in TLSv1.3, where payload can be changed, and extensions can be > mandated, without breaking backwards compatibility, it also makes > sense to: > > B). > > 1). MUST Codify use of a "Supported TLS Versions Extension" with > either a strong recommendation or MUST for a minimum of TLSv1.0 { 3, 1 > } to deprecate SSLv3.0 > * In the case where the extension is echoed. i.e. the lower > bound is signed in the handshake. > * This provides administrators with a clear indication of > supported versions and the ability to set their lower bound > * This is TLSv1.0 through TLSv1.2 compatible via extension > tolerance. > * Complete deprecation of SSLv3.0 would like be achieved by > the time TLSv1.3 is in the wild. > > 2). MUST tighten the wording with respect to the ClientHello > record layer and message layer versions > * Fix the record layer ClientHello version to the lower bound > { 3, 0 } ; which there seems to be some consensus for > * This is TLSv1.0 through TLSv1.2 compatible via extension > tolerance. Based on Nikos's comment there needs to be a clarification on the mitigation track (for TLSv1.0 through TLSv1.2) vs standards track (for TLSv1.3) on whether the ClientHello "record layer" lower bound is { 3, 0 } or { 3, 1 } and this could potentially be different in TLSv1.3? From my read, it seems in the time frame of current mitigations (SVSC in the field or Nikos's "Supported Versions Extension" as a more elegant forwards and backwards compatible version signalling mechanism). Nikos was pushing on { 3, 0 } for a current lower bound (at the record layer) for TLSv1.0 through TLSv1.2 as { 3, 1 } at the record layer in the current time-frame *allegedly* causes dancing for a few remaining upgrade recalcitrant servers. i.e. causing problems in the wild. This was my read. So the decision remains whether { 3, 0 } or { 3, 1 } is the "record layer" lower bound in TLSv1.3; depending on whether mitigation propagation has made provision for the lower bound to be raised to { 3, 1 } in TLSv1.3. Implementors tried { 3, 1 } and Nikos disagreed and said this compounded the dancing issue. We proposed a compromise that is both forwards and backwards compatible and it happened to match something Nikos had previously proposed. It was to pin { 3, 0 } at the record layer (essentially making the protocol major version the record layer version as opposed to TLSv1.0 { 3, 1 } ; this is in fact a record layer binary compatibility boundary) and listing "Supported TLS Versions Extension" with { 3, 1 } as a mandatory lower bound (ignored by the recalcitrant servers). This allows someone unwise to add SSLv3 { 3, 0 } to "Supported Versions" if they want to support it, but most importantly lets you signal { 3, 1 } as a signed lower bound in any TLS version (1.0 through 1.3) while showing { 3, 0 } at the record layer for compatibility. This seems ideal. I understand this is issue is already mitigated where it is important (using SVSC or other tightening mechanisms) rather the mechanism is completely not standardized. Sorry I am on the temporal track, not the standards track. I'll read these pull requests: https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/pull/105 https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/pull/107 Thanks for clarifications.
- [TLS] Last Call: <draft-ietf-tls-downgrade-scsv-0… The IESG
- Re: [TLS] Last Call: <draft-ietf-tls-downgrade-sc… Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos
- Re: [TLS] Last Call: <draft-ietf-tls-downgrade-sc… Salz, Rich
- Re: [TLS] Last Call: <draft-ietf-tls-downgrade-sc… Stephen Farrell
- Re: [TLS] Last Call: <draft-ietf-tls-downgrade-sc… Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos
- Re: [TLS] Last Call: <draft-ietf-tls-downgrade-sc… Stephen Farrell
- Re: [TLS] Last Call: <draft-ietf-tls-downgrade-sc… Bodo Moeller
- Re: [TLS] Last Call: <draft-ietf-tls-downgrade-sc… Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos
- Re: [TLS] Last Call: <draft-ietf-tls-downgrade-sc… Hanno Böck
- Re: [TLS] Last Call: <draft-ietf-tls-downgrade-sc… Yuhong Bao
- Re: [TLS] Last Call: <draft-ietf-tls-downgrade-sc… Adam Langley
- Re: [TLS] Last Call: <draft-ietf-tls-downgrade-sc… Andrei Popov
- Re: [TLS] Last Call: <draft-ietf-tls-downgrade-sc… Watson Ladd
- Re: [TLS] Last Call: <draft-ietf-tls-downgrade-sc… Bodo Moeller
- Re: [TLS] Last Call: <draft-ietf-tls-downgrade-sc… Brian Smith
- Re: [TLS] Last Call: <draft-ietf-tls-downgrade-sc… Martin Rex
- Re: [TLS] Last Call: <draft-ietf-tls-downgrade-sc… Martin Rex
- Re: [TLS] Last Call: <draft-ietf-tls-downgrade-sc… Jeffrey Walton
- Re: [TLS] Last Call: <draft-ietf-tls-downgrade-sc… Yoav Nir
- Re: [TLS] Last Call: <draft-ietf-tls-downgrade-sc… Eric Rescorla
- Re: [TLS] Last Call: <draft-ietf-tls-downgrade-sc… Salz, Rich
- Re: [TLS] Last Call: <draft-ietf-tls-downgrade-sc… Bodo Moeller
- Re: [TLS] Last Call: <draft-ietf-tls-downgrade-sc… Colm MacCárthaigh
- Re: [TLS] Last Call: <draft-ietf-tls-downgrade-sc… Yuhong Bao
- Re: [TLS] Last Call: <draft-ietf-tls-downgrade-sc… Martin Rex
- Re: [TLS] Last Call: <draft-ietf-tls-downgrade-sc… Salz, Rich
- Re: [TLS] Last Call: <draft-ietf-tls-downgrade-sc… Martin Rex
- Re: [TLS] Last Call: <draft-ietf-tls-downgrade-sc… Brian Smith
- Re: [TLS] Last Call: <draft-ietf-tls-downgrade-sc… Salz, Rich
- Re: [TLS] Last Call: <draft-ietf-tls-downgrade-sc… Martin Rex
- Re: [TLS] Last Call: <draft-ietf-tls-downgrade-sc… Martin Rex
- Re: [TLS] Last Call: <draft-ietf-tls-downgrade-sc… Xiaoyin Liu
- Re: [TLS] Last Call: <draft-ietf-tls-downgrade-sc… Yoav Nir
- Re: [TLS] Last Call: <draft-ietf-tls-downgrade-sc… Xiaoyin Liu
- Re: [TLS] Last Call: <draft-ietf-tls-downgrade-sc… Yoav Nir
- Re: [TLS] Last Call: <draft-ietf-tls-downgrade-sc… Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos
- Re: [TLS] Last Call: <draft-ietf-tls-downgrade-sc… Bodo Moeller
- Re: [TLS] Last Call: <draft-ietf-tls-downgrade-sc… Xiaoyin Liu
- Re: [TLS] Last Call: <draft-ietf-tls-downgrade-sc… Bodo Moeller
- Re: [TLS] Last Call: <draft-ietf-tls-downgrade-sc… Michael D'Errico
- Re: [TLS] Last Call: <draft-ietf-tls-downgrade-sc… Martin Rex
- Re: [TLS] Last Call: <draft-ietf-tls-downgrade-sc… Michael Clark
- Re: [TLS] Last Call: <draft-ietf-tls-downgrade-sc… Michael Clark
- Re: [TLS] Last Call: <draft-ietf-tls-downgrade-sc… Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos
- Re: [TLS] Last Call: <draft-ietf-tls-downgrade-sc… Michael Clark
- [TLS] advertizing the minimum TLS supported versi… Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos
- Re: [TLS] Last Call: <draft-ietf-tls-downgrade-sc… Jeffrey Walton
- Re: [TLS] Last Call: <draft-ietf-tls-downgrade-sc… Michael Clark
- Re: [TLS] advertizing the minimum TLS supported v… Michael Clark
- Re: [TLS] advertizing the minimum TLS supported v… Michael Clark
- Re: [TLS] Last Call: <draft-ietf-tls-downgrade-sc… Hubert Kario
- Re: [TLS] Last Call: <draft-ietf-tls-downgrade-sc… Henrik Grubbström
- Re: [TLS] Last Call: <draft-ietf-tls-downgrade-sc… Henrik Grubbström
- Re: [TLS] Last Call: <draft-ietf-tls-downgrade-sc… Bodo Moeller
- Re: [TLS] Last Call: <draft-ietf-tls-downgrade-sc… Bodo Moeller
- Re: [TLS] Last Call: <draft-ietf-tls-downgrade-sc… Dave Garrett
- Re: [TLS] Last Call: <draft-ietf-tls-downgrade-sc… Eric Rescorla
- Re: [TLS] Last Call: <draft-ietf-tls-downgrade-sc… Michael Clark
- Re: [TLS] Last Call: <draft-ietf-tls-downgrade-sc… Michael Clark
- Re: [TLS] Last Call: <draft-ietf-tls-downgrade-sc… Michael Clark
- Re: [TLS] Last Call: <draft-ietf-tls-downgrade-sc… Martin Rex
- Re: [TLS] Last Call: <draft-ietf-tls-downgrade-sc… Henrik Grubbström
- Re: [TLS] Last Call: <draft-ietf-tls-downgrade-sc… Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos
- Re: [TLS] Last Call: <draft-ietf-tls-downgrade-sc… Stephen Farrell
- Re: [TLS] Last Call: <draft-ietf-tls-downgrade-sc… Martin Rex