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Re: [TLS] OPTLS: Signature-less TLS 1.3

Hanno Böck <hanno@hboeck.de> Mon, 03 November 2014 17:32 UTC

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Date: Mon, 03 Nov 2014 18:32:47 +0100
From: Hanno Böck <hanno@hboeck.de>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] OPTLS: Signature-less TLS 1.3
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While you are discussing clock issues:
On Blackhat Amsterdam an attack on HSTS was presented involving an
NTP MitM. (code available [1])

Basically there's already a bunch of TLS related features that require
a reliable clock. And ntp is a zero-security protocol.
The issue of a secure system time needs to be adressed anyway.

I recently changed my servers from ntpd to tlsdated. That's probably
what everyone should do. (this still leaves open the question whom you
trust for your timesource - but it's certainly an improvement over
insecure ntp)

[1] https://github.com/PentesterES/Delorean
-- 
Hanno Böck
http://hboeck.de/

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