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Re: [TLS] PR#1091: Changes to provide middlebox robustness

Jana Iyengar <jri@google.com> Wed, 08 November 2017 00:06 UTC

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From: Jana Iyengar <jri@google.com>
Date: Tue, 07 Nov 2017 16:05:58 -0800
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To: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
Cc: "Salz, Rich" <rsalz@akamai.com>, "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] PR#1091: Changes to provide middlebox robustness
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FWIW: In my experience middleboxes don't ossify based on what the spec
says, they ossify based on what they see on the wire. So, if common
implementations send CCS in a particular way, that's what will get --- and,
I'll argue, what has gotten --- ossified. I also agree with David and Eric
that compatibility mode shouldn't be required because QUIC doesn't need it.



On Tue, Nov 7, 2017 at 3:57 PM, Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com> wrote:

>
>
> On Tue, Nov 7, 2017 at 3:41 PM, Salz, Rich <rsalz@akamai.com> wrote:
>
>> ➢ Given that we're almost there, and that only really browsers are
>>     asking for these hacks, and that even some of those were almost ready
>>     to ship without these hacks, I don't think that this is entirely
>>     unrealistic as an aspiration.
>>
>> The Internet is more than just a couple of browser executables.
>>
>> Does nobody think of the servers?
>>
>
> I do, but I don't really see how they're relevant for this question. Don't
> the servers control the middleboxes they are behind?
>
> -Ekr
>
>
>
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