Re: [TLS] [Cfrg] 3DES diediedie

Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie> Thu, 25 August 2016 02:41 UTC

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To: Tony Arcieri <bascule@gmail.com>, Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
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From: Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] [Cfrg] 3DES diediedie
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On 25/08/16 03:34, Tony Arcieri wrote:
>
> https://sweet32.info/

Nice work.

> On Wed, Aug 24, 2016 at 7:31 PM, Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu> wrote:
> 
>> Well, there is
>> https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-kaduk-kitten-des-des-des-die-die-die-00
>> but it is not really what you are looking for, I think, given the
>> recipient list on the message.
> 
> 
> I am particularly interested in 3DES's usage in TLS, given its previous MTI
> status in TLS, and because it was until very recently included in the
> OpenSSL "DEFAULT" ciphersuite list.

I guess there's sometimes value in those die-die-die RFCs. Given that
we have RFC7525/BCP195 [1] that already has a SHOULD NOT for effective
key sizes less than 128 bits, one could argue that the IETF has covered
that to a reasonable extent, in terms of RFCs saying to not do that.

But, if there was general support for such a draft, I'd be fine with
figuring out how to help get it done.

Cheers,
S.

[1] https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7525

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