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Re: [TLS] How are we planning to deprecate TLS 1.2?

Bas Westerbaan <bas@cloudflare.com> Fri, 03 March 2023 20:38 UTC

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From: Bas Westerbaan <bas@cloudflare.com>
Date: Fri, 03 Mar 2023 21:37:48 +0100
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To: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
Cc: Nimrod Aviram <nimrod.aviram@gmail.com>, "<tls@ietf.org>" <tls@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] How are we planning to deprecate TLS 1.2?
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>
> And of course, we really
> don't want to have to do major work on TLS 1.2, e.g. for Post-Quantum.
>

More to the point, I'd say the post-quantum transition is the natural
moment to move from ≤1.2 to 1.3.

(TLS 1.2 and earlier are vulnerable to PQ -> classical downgrades during
the transition because of CurveSwap like attacks.)

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