Re: [TLS] I-D Action: draft-ietf-tls-prohibiting-rc4-01.txt

[Geoffrey Keating <[e-mail]>]

Viktor Dukhovni <[e-mail]> writes:

> When OS is a just-in-case "upgrade" from cleartext to unauthenticated
> encrypted communication, there is requirement for "considered good"
> algorithms.  The prime-directive is to not disrupt communication,
> only then do we try to encrypt if possible.
...
> Leaving a cipher suite out is only practical once it is no longer
> the best shared cipher with any peers.

Suppose 20% of hosts will use RC4 if it is offered, and 0.1% will
refuse a connection if RC4 is not offered.  Then by not offering RC4,
you are downgrading 0.1% to plaintext (assuming that's what happens)
and upgrading 20% to a secure cipher---in the short term.  I believe
that in itself is likely to be a win overall.

But, some won't go to plaintext, they will instead fail to deliver
mail.  This will cause them to be fixed.  Others will look for a
different relay host, which might support better encryption.  So maybe
it's 0.01%?

And, in the long term, it's more likely that an administrator will
notice the failed SSL attempts than connections which succeed but use
insecure ciphers.

So, I don't think what you're saying is a general rule, and I think it
doesn't apply in this case.