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[TLS] Re: WG Last Call: draft-ietf-tls-mlkem-05 (Ends 2025-11-26)

Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com> Wed, 26 November 2025 19:52 UTC

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From: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
Date: Wed, 26 Nov 2025 11:51:32 -0800
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To: Muhammad Usama Sardar <muhammad_usama.sardar@tu-dresden.de>
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Subject: [TLS] Re: WG Last Call: draft-ietf-tls-mlkem-05 (Ends 2025-11-26)
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On Wed, Nov 26, 2025 at 11:28 AM Muhammad Usama Sardar <
muhammad_usama.sardar@tu-dresden.de> wrote:

> [ I haven't followed the discussions here; so apologies in advance but
> this seems very wrong ]
> On 26.11.25 19:59, D. J. Bernstein wrote:
>
> Recall from RFC 8446 that TLS
> 1.3 mandates ECC.
>
> What exactly do you mean by that? key_share in TLS 1.3 is clearly an
> optional extension as marked by * in [0]. Please point me to exact
> statement in RFC 8446bis that states that ECC is mandatory.
>

It's mandatory to implement per:
https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8446#section-9.1

   A TLS-compliant application MUST support key exchange with secp256r1
   (NIST P-256) and SHOULD support key exchange with X25519 [RFC7748].

Of course, from a technical perspective, nothing stops you from choosing
not to implement P-256 and as has been pointed out repeatedly, there are
no IETF protocol police; you'll just not be compliant with RFC 8446 in
this respect.

-Ekr

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