[TLS] Re: Review of draft-ietf-tls-openpgp-keys-08

Simon Josefsson <jas@extundo.com> wrote:
> Eric Rescorla <ekr@networkresonance.com> writes:
> > It's not undocumented. It's "add these certs to your bucket of certs"
> > and use them in whatever resolution mechanism you have.
> 
> How are clients and servers, respectively, supposed to figure out
> which keys to include?
> 
> Presumably, they should not send their entire key ring, right?  Some
> properties of the resolution algorithms appear to be needed to pick
> the "appropriate" keys, and limit the set of keys to send.
> 
> Compare RFC 4346, which says on X.509 certs:
> 
>    certificate_list
>       This is a sequence (chain) of X.509v3 certificates.  The sender's
>       certificate must come first in the list.  Each following
>       certificate must directly certify the one preceding it.  Because
>       certificate validation requires that root keys be distributed
>       independently, the self-signed certificate that specifies the root
>       certificate authority may optionally be omitted from the chain,
>       under the assumption that the remote end must already possess it
>       in order to validate it in any case.
> 
> What I'm looking for are similar guidelines to decide which OpenPGP
> keys to include, but I'm skeptical about the existence of useful such
> guidelines.

Rather than arguing about whether such rules are possible (though 
I think they are in practice), why don't we see if Pasi wants to
try to write something?

-Ekr

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