Re: [TLS] A closer look at ROBOT, BB Attacks, timing attacks in general, and what we can do in TLS

Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com> Fri, 15 December 2017 18:13 UTC

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From: Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com>
Date: Fri, 15 Dec 2017 10:12:59 -0800
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To: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
Cc: Ilari Liusvaara <ilariliusvaara@welho.com>, "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] A closer look at ROBOT, BB Attacks, timing attacks in general, and what we can do in TLS
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We can force a rotate of all certs in 90 days, and I don't think most
people will notice.

On Fri, Dec 15, 2017 at 10:07 AM, Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>; wrote:
> I'm not quite following how this helps. It's true that if SHA-256 is broken,
> we're in serious trouble, but that's largely because of the fact that that's
> what people's certificates have, so clients really can't refuse to support
> SHA-256 certificates. So, how does adding new algorithms help? (That's why I
> would argue that the existing SHA-384 support doesn't help).
>
> -Ekr
>
>
> On Fri, Dec 15, 2017 at 9:46 AM, Ilari Liusvaara <ilariliusvaara@welho.com>;
> wrote:
>>
>> On Fri, Dec 15, 2017 at 02:57:33PM +0000, Andrei Popov wrote:
>> > From: TLS [mailto:tls-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of Ilari Liusvaara
>> > > Even nastier dependency: SHA-2. If that breaks, currently both TLS
>> > > 1.2 and 1.3 break. There are no alternatives defined.
>> >
>> > Here's an attempt to define a SHA-2 alternative:
>> > https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-wconner-blake2sigs-01
>>
>> Also would need TLS ciphersuite codepoints with alternative handshake
>> hash algorithms.
>>
>>
>> -Ilari
>>
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