[TLS] Re: Confirming PQ+T Signatures Consensus
tirumal reddy <kondtir@gmail.com> Thu, 01 October 2026 06:41 UTC
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From: tirumal reddy <kondtir@gmail.com>
Date: Thu, 01 Oct 2026 12:11:08 +0530
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To: Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com>
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Subject: [TLS] Re: Confirming PQ+T Signatures Consensus
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On Wed, 30 Sept 2026 at 18:59, Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com> wrote: > On Tue, Sep 29, 2026 at 11:18 PM tirumal reddy <kondtir@gmail.com> wrote: > > > > Hi Stephen, > > > > Deployability should be judged against the deployments that need PQ/T > authentication, not only the Web PKI. In 3GPP and Enterprise networks, > device identities and trust anchors are provisioned at manufacture, used > for several years, and often cannot be replaced quickly. > > Rapid key rotation is not a remediation these deployments can rely on. > 3GPP TR 33.703 recently decided to consider composite ML-DSA certificates > for normative work. > > This is exactly where hash based signatures would make a lot of sense. > 3GPP TR 33.703 treats SLH-DSA as a backup for cryptographic diversity. SLH-DSA complements composite; it does not replace it. SLH-DSA also has no support in TPMs; TPM 2.0 (v1.85) adds ML-DSA but not SLH-DSA. > > > > Cheers, > > -Tiru > > > > On Tue, 29 Sept 2026 at 17:03, Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell= > 40cs.tcd.ie@dmarc.ietf.org> wrote: > >> > >> > >> Hiya, > >> > >> On 28/09/2026 17:52, Sean Turner wrote: > >> > 1. Should the WG work on PQ + T Hybrid Signatures for TLS? > >> > >> Yes, but... the work should be aiming for something that has > >> a chance of wide deployment, for random web sites, including > >> esp. self-hosted ones, who need to work with standard browsers > >> and other standard clients. > >> > >> If that's not possible, the WG should slow-peddle until we > >> find a scheme that does meet that requirement. So maybe do > >> start the work, but don't progress anything until we think we > >> can meet this could-be-widely-deployed requirement. > >> > >> I'd prefer the approach we took with encrypted SNI, to work > >> first on a document akin to RFC 8744. > >> > >> > 2. Should the WG only work on one: -pqt-dual-certs or > -composite-ml-dsa? > >> > >> Too early to say, given my answer to #1. Having >1 way to > >> achieve the goal would be a bad plan, but neither of those > >> drafts seems likely sufficiently useful to me. > >> > >> > 3. Should the WG work on: -pqt-dual-certs? > >> > >> In the longer term, I think a dual approach is better, but I > >> don't see sufficient support for this draft now, so: no to > >> this one from me, for now. (I'm also not keen on the specifics > >> of the mechanism in the draft as-is.) > >> > >> > 4. Should the WG work on: -composite-ml-dsa? > >> > >> Despite this being easy to spec, I don't think it's really > >> that useful, if browsers/root-stores don't want it, and if > >> the biggest web-PKI CA has said they also won't be going > >> there. So, also a no from me for that, for now. > >> > >> I also don't think that having N people say "yes" to these > >> questions is a good basis on which to proceed, given that > >> it seems such schemes won't be widely deployable. (The > >> regulatory justifications for doing this won't be satisfied > >> if nobody can really use it.) So, I'd encourage the chairs > >> to not just count responses as the way to decide this. (And > >> there's been too much of that in this WG recently anyway:-) > >> > >> Cheers, > >> S. > >> > >> > >> > > >> > Cheers, > >> > spt (for the chairs) > >> > > >> > [1] https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/polls-126-tls-202607241600/ > >> > [2] https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-reddy-tls-composite-mldsa/ > >> > [3] https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-yusef-tls-pqt-dual-certs/ > >> > [4] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Qp1s1UMmhTI > >> > [5] > https://datatracker.ietf.org/meeting/126/materials/slides-126-tls-framing-pq-t-signatures-for-tls-00 > >> > _______________________________________________ > >> > TLS mailing list -- tls@ietf.org > >> > To unsubscribe send an email to tls-leave@ietf.org > >> > >> _______________________________________________ > >> TLS mailing list -- tls@ietf.org > >> To unsubscribe send an email to tls-leave@ietf.org > > > > _______________________________________________ > > TLS mailing list -- tls@ietf.org > > To unsubscribe send an email to tls-leave@ietf.org > > > > -- > Astra mortemque praestare gradatim >
- [TLS] Confirming PQ+T Signatures Consensus Sean Turner
- [TLS] Re: Confirming PQ+T Signatures Consensus John Mattsson
- [TLS] Re: [EXTERNAL] Re: Confirming PQ+T Signatur… Andrei Popov
- [TLS] Re: [EXTERNAL] Re: Confirming PQ+T Signatur… Loganaden Velvindron
- [TLS] Re: Confirming PQ+T Signatures Consensus Salz, Rich
- [TLS] Re: Confirming PQ+T Signatures Consensus Watson Ladd
- [TLS] Re: Confirming PQ+T Signatures Consensus Salz, Rich
- [TLS] Re: Confirming PQ+T Signatures Consensus Yaakov Stein
- [TLS] Re: Confirming PQ+T Signatures Consensus Martin Thomson
- [TLS] Re: Confirming PQ+T Signatures Consensus Russ Housley
- [TLS] Re: [EXTERNAL] Confirming PQ+T Signatures C… Andrei Popov
- [TLS] Re: [EXTERNAL] Confirming PQ+T Signatures C… John Mattsson
- [TLS] Re: [EXTERNAL] Confirming PQ+T Signatures C… Muhammad Usama Sardar
- [TLS] Re: [EXTERNAL] Confirming PQ+T Signatures C… Andrei Popov
- [TLS] Re: [EXTERNAL] Confirming PQ+T Signatures C… John Mattsson
- [TLS] Re: [EXTERNAL] Confirming PQ+T Signatures C… Samuel Lee (ENS/Crypto)
- [TLS] Re: [EXTERNAL] Confirming PQ+T Signatures C… Soatok Dreamseeker
- [TLS] Re: [EXTERNAL] Confirming PQ+T Signatures C… Bellebaum, Thomas
- [TLS] Re: Confirming PQ+T Signatures Consensus David Benjamin
- [TLS] Re: Confirming PQ+T Signatures Consensus Filippo Valsorda
- [TLS] Re: [EXTERNAL] Confirming PQ+T Signatures C… Samuel Lee (ENS/Crypto)
- [TLS] Re: [EXT] Re: [EXTERNAL] Confirming PQ+T Si… Blumenthal, Uri - 0553 - MITLL
- [TLS] Re: Confirming PQ+T Signatures Consensus Scott Fluhrer (sfluhrer)
- [TLS] Re: Confirming PQ+T Signatures Consensus Andrey Jivsov
- [TLS] Re: Confirming PQ+T Signatures Consensus tirumal reddy
- [TLS] Re: Confirming PQ+T Signatures Consensus Rifaat Shekh-Yusef
- [TLS] Re: Confirming PQ+T Signatures Consensus Bas Westerbaan
- [TLS] Re: Confirming PQ+T Signatures Consensus Eric Rescorla
- [TLS] Re: Confirming PQ+T Signatures Consensus loic.ferreira
- [TLS] Re: Confirming PQ+T Signatures Consensus Stephen Farrell
- [TLS] Re: Confirming PQ+T Signatures Consensus tirumal reddy
- [TLS] Re: Confirming PQ+T Signatures Consensus Watson Ladd
- [TLS] Re: Confirming PQ+T Signatures Consensus tirumal reddy
- [TLS] Re: Confirming PQ+T Signatures Consensus Ilari Liusvaara
- [TLS] Re: Confirming PQ+T Signatures Consensus Sophie Schmieg
- [TLS] Re: Confirming PQ+T Signatures Consensus Ilari Liusvaara
- [TLS] Re: Confirming PQ+T Signatures Consensus Paul Wouters
- [TLS] Re: Confirming PQ+T Signatures Consensus Andrey Jivsov
- [TLS] Re: Confirming PQ+T Signatures Consensus Soatok Dreamseeker
- [TLS] Re: Confirming PQ+T Signatures Consensus Joe Birr-Pixton
- [TLS] Re: Confirming PQ+T Signatures Consensus olivier.sanders
- [TLS] Re: Confirming PQ+T Signatures Consensus Daniel Van Geest
- [TLS] Re: [EXTERNAL] Confirming PQ+T Signatures C… John Gray
- [TLS] Re: [EXTERNAL] Confirming PQ+T Signatures C… Ira McDonald
- [TLS] Re: Confirming PQ+T Signatures Consensus Richard Barnes
- [TLS] Re: Confirming PQ+T Signatures Consensus Chase Abbott
- [TLS] Re: Confirming PQ+T Signatures Consensus Jan Klaußner
- [TLS] Re: Confirming PQ+T Signatures Consensus Ryan Appel
- [TLS] Re: Confirming PQ+T Signatures Consensus Yaroslav Rosomakho
- [TLS] Re: Confirming PQ+T Signatures Consensus Damien Miller
- [TLS] Re: Confirming PQ+T Signatures Consensus Loganaden Velvindron
- [TLS] Re: Confirming PQ+T Signatures Consensus Wang Guilin
- [TLS] Re: Confirming PQ+T Signatures Consensus Hannes Tschofenig
- [TLS] Re: Confirming PQ+T Signatures Consensus Bashiri, Kaveh
- [TLS] Re: Confirming PQ+T Signatures Consensus Dan Wing