Return-Path: X-Original-To: tls@ietfa.amsl.com Delivered-To: tls@ietfa.amsl.com Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 203D83A0DAD for ; Thu, 4 Jun 2020 09:37:58 -0700 (PDT) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com X-Spam-Flag: NO X-Spam-Score: -1.896 X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-1.896 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, DKIM_SIGNED=0.1, DKIM_VALID=-0.1, HTML_MESSAGE=0.001, SPF_HELO_NONE=0.001, SPF_NONE=0.001, URIBL_BLOCKED=0.001] autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no Authentication-Results: ietfa.amsl.com (amavisd-new); dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=rtfm-com.20150623.gappssmtp.com Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id tL6ylyGNnz7J for ; Thu, 4 Jun 2020 09:37:56 -0700 (PDT) Received: from mail-lj1-x22d.google.com (mail-lj1-x22d.google.com [IPv6:2a00:1450:4864:20::22d]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 (128/128 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 88D4F3A0D12 for ; Thu, 4 Jun 2020 09:37:55 -0700 (PDT) Received: by mail-lj1-x22d.google.com with SMTP id c17so8090124lji.11 for ; Thu, 04 Jun 2020 09:37:55 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=rtfm-com.20150623.gappssmtp.com; s=20150623; h=mime-version:references:in-reply-to:from:date:message-id:subject:to :cc; bh=J0/WQu8/0quVezHK6P9GmIRCDFKFkSLn/dSydy53rfo=; b=b2Hg9WGR/Fu/njig6Db1wNByk1W6frzMU4qxdrTwotaFZu8vNBkA5DS5DxiZPnGvIb UfmJlL8XNDZKzaMH91npH9FJgeiMl4k3iusk7qZFp3GfHdnVnFZR+qTI/XpF6Np5hQa4 nuSpR2ogIpa81qljik4kERXaQjJmkFXbLrllg1I+DRKMExiXB6Emc2OFmpEH6gpC3UyU OQxOoFQcYwzkMe4q62Xroh5RlpNDLYehff10thSgXJwJBwKMGCBUbTMM9eQGQmLysHia iT2RD1PHLh9w7iQ6GQU31l9RuQkIsUPbf5TGKTS+arWj/x7UO1K/hG75K+U0z6OYiNE2 2uUg== X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20161025; h=x-gm-message-state:mime-version:references:in-reply-to:from:date :message-id:subject:to:cc; bh=J0/WQu8/0quVezHK6P9GmIRCDFKFkSLn/dSydy53rfo=; b=ptxj+tN0tlDBDuaOqrWx2hMnAtIyiJqN0W4Hv11n6OUE5gSGUaWPQtFcfKVxEBFznF GJBGdkRGjguH8qcS9wXqipkbCL7JTCAxZ/r3KaKVqKeXWl9/s5TqTjUIpFnkyw4e7aL4 jYbBbObnu10CUVKae5yWYYDP6iFy1xVktzQwdA8cYnt559WOoIzlhAODxMb6uUf7gMaA phxgQ30jKZPbRun84EEXtKsw5QxdOp/GhdGQDIVartf+pJLCQFql6kWMYLxMwqHNhLVv aObRh5pL7OmxB8KLzlarw51Xd+cZgSCaeV56PprhRVSfUfagoGhpqt3ji087PQitcC9Y OcgQ== X-Gm-Message-State: AOAM533fgHY4To1FLrR4gnFTojIEE1Wk2w9iAVm6RWGuN6qe9kI1MJ5y 1IA5TTYSzejD6V+IsyeBsTizK8eZZI403LpFGafnAg== X-Google-Smtp-Source: ABdhPJz0eYU5Du7r/4GlghjjooqeLsxHc65UK7nBhEFOk8drExKJETBr8OFOgZxmtbup8jXFRHwx/ORXfY0acGHQFmM= X-Received: by 2002:a2e:3609:: with SMTP id d9mr2429215lja.409.1591288673575; Thu, 04 Jun 2020 09:37:53 -0700 (PDT) MIME-Version: 1.0 References: <20200604000011.387A5F4070F@rfc-editor.org> <73b5d3e2-d2f4-447c-84d6-0ae0a08374a9@www.fastmail.com> <070E5A6D-7D2F-405A-B5D8-8C90379306D9@vigilsec.com> In-Reply-To: <070E5A6D-7D2F-405A-B5D8-8C90379306D9@vigilsec.com> From: Eric Rescorla Date: Thu, 4 Jun 2020 09:37:17 -0700 Message-ID: To: Russ Housley Cc: Martin Thomson , IETF TLS Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="0000000000001fd61105a744c4f6" Archived-At: Subject: Re: [TLS] [Editorial Errata Reported] RFC8446 (6204) X-BeenThere: tls@ietf.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.29 Precedence: list List-Id: "This is the mailing list for the Transport Layer Security working group of the IETF." List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Thu, 04 Jun 2020 16:38:04 -0000 --0000000000001fd61105a744c4f6 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" On Thu, Jun 4, 2020 at 9:24 AM Russ Housley wrote: > Eric: > > On Wed, Jun 3, 2020 at 6:07 PM Martin Thomson wrote: >> >>> I think that this is a useful erratum and it should be approved/HFDU. >>> The extension to which this text alludes is RFC 8773, not >>> post_handshake_auth. >>> >> >> Yes, although 8773 actually is not super-clear about post-handshake, so >> that's actually something we should clarify there. >> >> >> RFC 8773 is not intended for post handshake. So, I never thought about >> that. What is the use case you are considering? >> > > I don't have one. I'm just trying to make sure things are clear. perhaps > an erratum on 8773 to make ultra clear? > > > I do not find it unclear. > I am looking at 5.2 which seems like it could be more precise. > What do you have in mind? > Changing: TLS 1.3 does not permit the server to send a CertificateRequest message when a PSK is being used. This restriction is removed when the "tls_cert_with_extern_psk" extension is negotiated, allowing certificate-based authentication for both the client and the server. To: TLS 1.3 does not permit the server to send a CertificateRequest message when a PSK is being used. This restriction is removed when the "tls_cert_with_extern_psk" extension is negotiated, allowing certificate-based authentication for both the client and the server. To: TLS 1.3 does not permit the server to send a CertificateRequest message when a PSK is being used. This restriction is removed when the "tls_cert_with_extern_psk" extension is negotiated, allowing certificate-based authentication for both the client and the server. To: TLS 1.3 does not permit the server to send a CertificateRequest message when a PSK is being used. This restriction is removed for the main handshake when the "tls_cert_with_extern_psk" extension is negotiated, allowing certificate-based authentication for both the client and the server. This extension has no impact on external PSK usage with post-handshake authentication, which is prohibited by TLS 1.3. -Ekr Russ > > --0000000000001fd61105a744c4f6 Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable


=
On Thu, Jun 4, 2020 at 9:24 AM Russ H= ousley <housley@vigilsec.com= > wrote:
Eric:

=
On Wed, Jun 3, 2020 at 6:07 PM Martin Thomson <mt@lowentropy.net> wrote:<= br>
I think that thi= s is a useful erratum and it should be approved/HFDU.=C2=A0 The extension t= o which this text alludes is RFC 8773, not post_handshake_auth.

Yes, although 8773 actually is not super-clear abo= ut post-handshake, so that's actually something we should clarify there= .

RFC 8773 is not in= tended for post handshake.=C2=A0 So, I never thought about that.=C2=A0 What= is the use case you are considering?
I don't have one. I'm just trying to make sure things = are clear. perhaps an erratum on 8773 to make ultra clear?
<= /div>

I do not find it unclear. =C2=A0

I am looking at 5.2 which se= ems like it could be more precise.

=C2=A0
What do you have in mind?

= Changing:
=C2=A0 =C2=A0TLS 1.3 does not permit the server to send a Cert= ificateRequest
=C2=A0 =C2=A0message when a PSK is being used. This restr= iction is removed when
=C2=A0 =C2=A0the "tls_cert_with_extern_psk&q= uot; extension is negotiated, allowing
=C2=A0 =C2=A0certificate-based au= thentication for both the client and the
=C2=A0 =C2=A0server.=C2=A0To: T= LS 1.3 does not permit the server to send a
=C2=A0 =C2=A0CertificateRequ= est message when a PSK is being used. This restriction
=C2=A0 =C2=A0is r= emoved when the "tls_cert_with_extern_psk" extension is
=C2=A0= =C2=A0negotiated, allowing certificate-based authentication for both the=C2=A0 =C2=A0client and the server.

To:
=C2=A0 =C2=A0TLS 1.3 do= es not permit the server to send a CertificateRequest
=C2=A0 =C2=A0messa= ge when a PSK is being used. This restriction is removed when
=C2=A0 =C2= =A0the "tls_cert_with_extern_psk" extension is negotiated, allowi= ng
=C2=A0 =C2=A0certificate-based authentication for both the client and= the
=C2=A0 =C2=A0server.=C2=A0To: TLS 1.3 does not permit the server to= send a
=C2=A0 =C2=A0CertificateRequest message when a PSK is being used= . This
=C2=A0 =C2=A0restriction is removed for the main handshake when t= he
=C2=A0 =C2=A0"tls_cert_with_extern_psk" extension is negoti= ated, allowing
=C2=A0 =C2=A0certificate-based authentication for both th= e client and the
=C2=A0 =C2=A0server. This extension has no impact on ex= ternal PSK usage
=C2=A0 =C2=A0with post-handshake authentication, which = is prohibited by
=C2=A0 =C2=A0TLS 1.3.
=C2=A0=C2=A0
-Ekr

Russ

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