Re: [TLS] analysis of wider impact of TLS1.3 replayabe data

Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com> Sun, 13 March 2016 16:22 UTC

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From: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
Date: Sun, 13 Mar 2016 17:21:28 +0100
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To: Yoav Nir <ynir.ietf@gmail.com>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] analysis of wider impact of TLS1.3 replayabe data
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On Sun, Mar 13, 2016 at 3:51 PM, Yoav Nir <ynir.ietf@gmail.com>; wrote:

>
> > On 13 Mar 2016, at 4:45 PM, Salz, Rich <rsalz@akamai.com>; wrote:
> >
> >> I also think it is prudent to assume that implementers will turn on
> replayable
> >> data even if nobody has figured out the consequences.
> >
> > I very much agree.  Customers, particularly those in the mobile field,
> will look at this and say "I can avoid an extra RTT?  *TURN IT ON*" without
> fully understanding, or perhaps even really caring about, the security
> implications.
>
> Perhaps, and I think IoT devices are likely to do so as well.
>
> Is OpenSSL going to implement this? Are all the browsers?
>

There are already patches in preparation for this for NSS and I expect
Firefox to
implement it, as long as we have any indication that a reasonable numbers of
servers will accept it.

-Ekr


> (only the first one is directed specifically at you, Rich…)
>
> Yoav
>
>
>
>