Re: [TLS] TLS-OBC proposal

Anders Rundgren <> Sun, 04 September 2011 19:30 UTC

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Date: Sun, 04 Sep 2011 21:31:18 +0200
From: Anders Rundgren <>
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To: Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos <>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] TLS-OBC proposal
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Maybe I was a bit unclear.

I'm not suggesting mine or the gazillion of similar solutions
as an alternative to TLS-OBC since they address entirely different

However, I'm asking if an enhanced TLS-OBC could replace them by
increasing the scope of the proposal.  I'm not enough of a expert
in TLS too see if it is possible or a good idea, I just want to
point out that there is a great need for a better HTTPS CCA.
Otherwise the mentioned solutions would not exist.

In fact, I believe there may be more users of app-level HTTPS CCA
than there users of "genuine" HTTPS CCA.


On 2011-09-04 19:32, Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos wrote:
> On 09/04/2011 06:42 PM, Anders Rundgren wrote:
>> If I OTOH have go the session-stuff wrong, please just ignore my
>> ignorant comments.  FWIW, I have developed an app-level CCA
>> (Client-Certificate Authentication) mechanism derived from the
>> numerous proprietary solutions out there.
>> If you come up with a generic solution, I will gladly retire it!
>> Traditional TLS-CCA sucks, and logout is by no means "a subtle UI
>> problem"; it goes to the core.
> The problem is layer mixing. I believe you understand that TLS
> authentication is about authentication of the TLS session and not the
> HTTP session which is on a layer above. If you naively use the TLS
> authentication for HTTP authentication you have the issues current
> applications face. TLS-OBC as I understand it, ties better the HTTP and
> TLS certificate authentication to prevent the issues currently seen. The
> advantage is that it re-uses the existing mechanisms.
> I cannot read your approach in the xml file, but I understand that you
> moved authentication to the application layer. This is an alternative
> approach.
> regards,
> Nikos
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