Re: [TLS] PR #624: Remove Supplemental Auth from TLS 1.3

Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com> Wed, 07 September 2016 04:00 UTC

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From: Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com>
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Date: Tue, 6 Sep 2016 23:58:14 -0400
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To: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
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Cc: IETF TLS <tls@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [TLS] PR #624: Remove Supplemental Auth from TLS 1.3
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I agree that client_authz and server_authz have not enjoyed much implementation.

Russ


On Sep 3, 2016, at 3:54 PM, Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com> wrote:

> https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/pull/624
> 
> We currently have code points assigned for
> 
>  user_mapping [RFC4681]     
>  client_authz [RFC5878]      
>  server_authz [RFC5878] 
> 
> These aren't well-specified for use in TLS 1.3 and my sense is that they
> are barely used. Any objections to just banning them? If not, I'll merge this
> PR end of next week.
> 
> -Ekr