Re: [TLS] draft-shore-tks-dnssec-chains-extension

[Paul Wouters <[e-mail]>]

On Wed, 22 Jul 2015, Viktor Dukhovni wrote:

>> I think the server should stick to one chain, from the root to itself,
>> so it does not have to deal with variable chain blobs per client.
>> That will allow server code to stick to something like hourly
>> regenerating the blob for use with all clients.
>
>> From the root to its own TLSA RRset, however, this can be complicated
> in the presence of CNAMEs:

> Should everything other than the first CNAME be in additional
> records?

I think so.

>  Should all the above (with their RRSIGs) be in the answer
> section, with the union of the supporting DNSKEY/RRSIG/DS records
> as additional?

No, only the TLSA record and its RRSIG should be in there, so it is
identical to a real DNS response packet.

> I tried to ask a related question during the meeting, but bandwidth
> to explain the context was limited:  Should proofs of non-delegation
> be included, to keep gTLDs and ccTLDs honest for some future CT for
> DNS?  Specifically, suppose you see:
>
> 	_443._tcp.www.example.com. IN TLSA <rrdata>
>
> with an RRSIG from the ".com" zone, should there also be NSEC/NSEC3
> records that demonstrate that "example.com" (and www.example.com)
> are not delegated?  (Such records might then be subject to "gossip"
> or related "transparency" counter-measures).

That's an interesting question. I'd be tempted not to do this work in
the TLS extension but keep that to a ct-dnssec document.

>> I do strongly prefer the binary blob to be in raw dns format. That
>> will make parsing easier with existing code, and over time we will
>> not run into issues where dns libraries support newer algorithms
>> but this specific dnssec parsing code isn't updated.
>
> I'm not sure what "algorithms" you have in mind?

The successor to ECDSA or something like Curve*. I meant new DNSKEY
algorithms used to generate RRSIG records. I would like to see DNS
code maintained by DNS people used by browser people but I am young and
naive.

>  We should perhaps
> allow (even encourage) "compression" to reduce the payload size,

Is that a problem in TLS? I thought the CA chains were already massively
bigger? Or is this something specific to the client/server hello
message?

>> As for ekr's question on why not stuff this inside X.509, that would not
>> be compatible with tls raw pulic keys that only contain a SBKI, and drag
>> back into the protocol more ASN.1 parsing and containers.
>
> This really can't go in the certificate, because then certificates
> would have to be updated as often as RRSIGS are regenerated.  That
> seems exceedingly unlikely to be deployable.

I agree, but Adam Langley did make that work so perhaps we are wrong?

Paul