Re: [TLS] KeyUpdate and unbounded write obligations
Ilari Liusvaara <ilariliusvaara@welho.com> Thu, 01 September 2016 21:09 UTC
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Date: Fri, 02 Sep 2016 00:09:52 +0300
From: Ilari Liusvaara <ilariliusvaara@welho.com>
To: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
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Cc: IETF TLS <tls@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [TLS] KeyUpdate and unbounded write obligations
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On Thu, Sep 01, 2016 at 12:55:29PM -0700, Eric Rescorla wrote: > I have created a PR for this at: > https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/pull/611 > > As it seems there was rough consensus for this change, I will merge this > weekend > absent some violent objections or direction to the contrary from the chairs. > > -Ekr I tried to implement this, and discovered an issue: The client handshake traffic secret is needed for deriving client Finished, and client application traffic secret is only needed after that point. However, the derivation of client application traffic secret uses handshake hash post Server Finished. So you either need to buffer the handshake hash value, or have two overlapping client traffic secrets. Changing the client application traffic secret context to extend up to Client Finished would solve the issue. Additionally: - That would make the implementation look nicely symmetric - Would also prevent having "not yet" keys. One can derive keys from present state and install them immediately. -Ilari
- Re: [TLS] KeyUpdate and unbounded write obligatio… Keith Winstein
- Re: [TLS] KeyUpdate and unbounded write obligatio… Keith Winstein
- Re: [TLS] KeyUpdate and unbounded write obligatio… Stephen Farrell
- Re: [TLS] KeyUpdate and unbounded write obligatio… Adam Langley
- Re: [TLS] KeyUpdate and unbounded write obligatio… Keith Winstein
- Re: [TLS] KeyUpdate and unbounded write obligatio… Adam Langley
- Re: [TLS] KeyUpdate and unbounded write obligatio… Keith Winstein
- Re: [TLS] KeyUpdate and unbounded write obligatio… Adam Langley
- Re: [TLS] KeyUpdate and unbounded write obligatio… Keith Winstein
- Re: [TLS] KeyUpdate and unbounded write obligatio… Jim Schaad
- Re: [TLS] KeyUpdate and unbounded write obligatio… Adam Langley
- Re: [TLS] KeyUpdate and unbounded write obligatio… Benjamin Kaduk
- Re: [TLS] KeyUpdate and unbounded write obligatio… David Benjamin
- Re: [TLS] KeyUpdate and unbounded write obligatio… Keith Winstein
- Re: [TLS] KeyUpdate and unbounded write obligatio… David Benjamin
- Re: [TLS] KeyUpdate and unbounded write obligatio… Benjamin Kaduk
- Re: [TLS] KeyUpdate and unbounded write obligatio… Ilari Liusvaara
- Re: [TLS] KeyUpdate and unbounded write obligatio… Keith Winstein
- [TLS] KeyUpdate and unbounded write obligations David Benjamin
- Re: [TLS] KeyUpdate and unbounded write obligatio… Subodh Iyengar
- Re: [TLS] KeyUpdate and unbounded write obligatio… Judson Wilson
- Re: [TLS] KeyUpdate and unbounded write obligatio… Keith Winstein
- Re: [TLS] KeyUpdate and unbounded write obligatio… Ilari Liusvaara
- Re: [TLS] KeyUpdate and unbounded write obligatio… Keith Winstein
- Re: [TLS] KeyUpdate and unbounded write obligatio… Eric Rescorla
- Re: [TLS] KeyUpdate and unbounded write obligatio… Ilari Liusvaara
- Re: [TLS] KeyUpdate and unbounded write obligatio… Eric Rescorla
- Re: [TLS] KeyUpdate and unbounded write obligatio… Ilari Liusvaara
- Re: [TLS] KeyUpdate and unbounded write obligatio… Eric Rescorla
- Re: [TLS] KeyUpdate and unbounded write obligatio… Adam Langley
- Re: [TLS] KeyUpdate and unbounded write obligatio… Eric Rescorla
- Re: [TLS] KeyUpdate and unbounded write obligatio… Russ Housley
- Re: [TLS] KeyUpdate and unbounded write obligatio… Eric Rescorla
- Re: [TLS] KeyUpdate and unbounded write obligatio… Ilari Liusvaara
- Re: [TLS] KeyUpdate and unbounded write obligatio… Keith Winstein
- Re: [TLS] KeyUpdate and unbounded write obligatio… Eric Rescorla
- Re: [TLS] KeyUpdate and unbounded write obligatio… Ilari Liusvaara
- Re: [TLS] KeyUpdate and unbounded write obligatio… Eric Rescorla
- Re: [TLS] KeyUpdate and unbounded write obligatio… David Benjamin
- Re: [TLS] KeyUpdate and unbounded write obligatio… Ilari Liusvaara
- Re: [TLS] KeyUpdate and unbounded write obligatio… Ilari Liusvaara
- Re: [TLS] KeyUpdate and unbounded write obligatio… Keith Winstein